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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Loncar Talks With Vulkov, Meets Filip Dimitrov

*AU1904145791 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1300 GMT 19 Apr 91*

[Text] Today Budimir Loncar, federal secretary of foreign affairs of Yugoslavia, began his visit to Bulgaria.

The official talks between Viktor Vulkov, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs, and the Yugoslav federal secretary covered an extremely wide range of problems that are of interest to both sides in light of the democratic reforms under way in their countries. The two ministers exchanged detailed information, concentrating their attention primarily on bilateral relations in the spirit of the new European realities.

The official talks at ministerial level will continue. After completing the first round of talks, Mr. Loncar started meetings with representatives of the main political forces in Bulgaria. After Mr. Loncar's meeting with Mr. Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], my colleague Maksim Minkov interviewed the SDS leader:

[Begin interview recording] [Minkov] Your meeting lasted longer than planned. It was, in fact, the first official contact between the SDS Coordinating Council and Yugoslavia, was it not?

[Dimitrov] Yes, except for the meetings with the Yugoslav ambassador, of course. The talks were interesting, and friendly attitudes were shown by both sides. The Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs and the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Macedonia informed us about the situation in Yugoslavia and mentioned matters that will be discussed in the future concerning the referendum and various other problems affecting Yugoslavia. It was stressed that both sides want democracy, something that determines the present-day trends. Stress was also laid on their readiness to develop good-neighborly relations between the two states, based on respect for their sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs on the one hand, and on cooperation in various spheres of life on the other. The common view was shared that democratic institutions, oriented toward a free economy, seeking one's place in Europe and respect for human rights are the basic aspects of the development that is taking place in both countries because, despite certain differences, we start, to a large degree, from a similar position, as states that took part in, or gravitated toward, the Soviet bloc.

[Minkov] As I was given to understand, you put forward the viewpoint of the SDS in the foreign policy sphere, including our relations with neighboring countries. The specific nature of our mutual relations with Yugoslavia is known. In this context, can you tell us something more about your talks with the minister of foreign affairs of Macedonia, who took part in the meeting?

[Dimitrov] Mention was made of the declaration of the Bulgarian Government [concerning treatment of Bulgarians in Macedonia]. I took the opportunity to emphasize that this declaration has nothing to do with interference in the internal affairs of other countries, but was prompted by good-neighborly considerations.

[Minkov] Was the issue raised of reestablishing direct contacts between the SDS and parties and organizations in Yugoslavia or individual Yugoslav republics that at the moment are not in power, especially in the republics? Of course, the issue is rather complicated because the opposition is in power in Croatia, not in Serbia and Macedonia.

[Dimitrov] Yes, this was mentioned—by the Yugoslav side, in fact—as an additional possibility for developing contacts between the two states, a matter on which we have no differences.

[Minkov] Thank you, Mr. Dimitrov. [end interview recording]

SDS's Loncar Meets Zhelev, Popov in Sofia

*LD2004203691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0901 GMT 20 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Apr (TANJUG)—Zhelyu Zhelev, the president of the Republic of Bulgaria, in talks with Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar, has expressed full support for the integrity of Yugoslavia as a whole. In effect denying his recent statement on the "possible disintegration of Yugoslavia," Zhelev stressed that this was "a misinterpretation of the Bulgarian stand on Yugoslavia."

The Bulgarian prime minister, Dimitur Popov, stressed during his meeting with Budimir Loncar that "the destabilization of Yugoslavia would also cause the destabilization of the Balkans and the whole of Europe," and that his country will not undertake anything that would have negative consequences for its Western neighbor. Bulgaria does not have territorial pretensions to Yugoslavia, stressed Popov, assuring Loncar that this was a firm stand of the government and all the political forces in his country, with an exception of "some smaller formations that do not have a particular influence in society." Talking about the Bulgarian wish to change and improve the political atmosphere in the Balkans, Dimitur Popov said that such relations between the two countries, "which would lead them together toward Europe," should be established.

In a toast at dinner, the Bulgarian premier expressed a wish for the relations of the two countries to be a model of cooperation in the Balkans. In his reply, Loncar said that such wishes have a realistic foundation, but that their realization still requires a lot of effort, goodwill, and readiness to apply the norms of the new situation in Europe. Foreign Minister Loncar described the talks so

far as "open, sincere, and informative," adding that conditions were clearly ripe for such a profound dialogue.

During yesterday's talks between the federal secretary and the Bulgarian partners, the issue of the position of the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria was raised. The Yugoslav stand that in democratic processes all sections of the population must enjoy the fruits of the strengthening of human freedoms and rights was repeated. The CSCE contains a very strict norm of respecting borders, and inseparable from this norm is respect for the rights of those parts of nations that do not live in their native country. The reply of the Bulgarian side is expected today, in the second round of talks between Loncar and his host, Minister Viktor Vulkov.

The president of the Bulgarian Government, Dimitur Popov, invited Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic to visit Bulgaria.

The federal secretary, Budimir Loncar, late last night received representatives of the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria, who informed him of their position and problems in connection with the realization of basic human and civil rights and freedoms.

SFYR News Conference on Loncar Visit

*AU2604092991 Sofia BTA in English 0705 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Belgrade, April 16 (BTA corr. Nikola Kitsevski)— "The visit of the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar to Bulgaria is an expression of our conviction that truly good neighborly relations should be established in all spheres on the basis of patience and mutual tolerance." This is the assessment given by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to the recent visit of the Head of Yugoslavia's diplomacy to Sofia, expressed at a press conference of the ministry.

The question was raised whether it is considered normal for Yugoslavia's foreign minister to meet representatives of illegal organizations in Bulgaria, such as the Ilinden United Macedonian Organization is and what the ministry's reaction would be if Bulgaria's foreign minister took advantage of an official visit to Yugoslavia to receive representatives of an illegal organization in the Bulgarian Embassy. Mr. Sirjan Kerim, spokesman for the Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry, answered: "As far as I know, Mr. Loncar received some Bulgarian citizens who belong to the Macedonian national minority with the consent and the approval of the Bulgarian authorities. But I assure you that it could never happen to Bulgaria's foreign minister. He could never receive representatives of the Bulgarian national minority in Yugoslavia in an illegal form, as they enjoy the legal rights all other Yugoslavian citizens do, regardless of their origin."

The Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry's spokesman did not explain what the approval was and which Bulgarian

authorities it was received from. Neither did he mention what he meant by "the Bulgarian national minority in Yugoslavia": the officially recognized community of several tens of thousands of Bulgarians in Serbia or all Bulgarians in Yugoslavia.

ALBANIA

Draft Constitution for Republic Published

*91P20318A Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 10 Apr 91
pp 1-4*

["Text" of Draft Constitution of the Republic of Albania]

[Text]

FIRST PART

Chapter I

Fundamental Principles

Article 1

Albania is a Republic which expresses and defends the interests of the people and is based on their unity.

Article 2

The Republic of Albania is a democratic and juridical state which is based on social justice, on the protection of the freedoms and rights of the individual, and on political pluralism.

Article 3

The national sovereignty of the Republic of Albania belongs to the people.

The people exercise power through the intermediary of the representative organs and directly.

The representative organs are the People's Assembly and the people's councils.

No one other than the organs expressly stipulated in this Constitution can exercise national sovereignty and any of its attributes in the name of the Republic of Albania.

Article 4

The representative organs are elected by the people by universal, equal, direct, and secret vote.

The organization and manner of development of elections and the circumstances for the termination of the mandate of a deputy are stipulated by law.

Article 5

State activity is carried out on the basis of the Constitution and the laws.

The precise and uniform implementation of juridical norms is obligatory for all state organs, political parties, and other organs, and for officials.

The legislation of the Republic of Albania takes into consideration norms of international law which are generally known.

Article 6

All citizens are equal before the law.

Article 7

State activity is carried on only by state organs recognized by law.

Article 8

Political parties and other organizations are separate from the state. The state supports them and cooperates with them and creates conditions for the development of their activity so that, through democratic methods, they will influence state policy. The different organizations can be dissolved only under circumstances stipulated by law.

In the Republic of Albania, parties and organizations of a fascist, racist, and warmongering nature as well as those which aim to overthrow the order established by the Constitution are prohibited.

Article 9

In foreign relations, the Republic of Albania defends independence and national interests, pursues the policy of friendship, cooperation, peace, and international security.

The Republic of Albania is in favor of good neighborliness, relations with all states on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage.

The Republic of Albania opposes every form of aggression, national oppression, racial discrimination and terrorism. It upholds the principle of self-determination of peoples and the exercise of full national sovereignty and equality by all countries in international relations.

The Republic of Albania cooperates with international organizations and bodies operating on the basis of democratic and peace-loving principles.

Article 10

The Republic of Albania is concerned with the recognition and respecting of the national and democratic rights of the Albanian population living outside the state borders of the Republic.

Article 11

The following types of ownership exist in the Republic of Albania: State property, the property of cooperatives and of other organizations, and private property.

All three types of ownership enjoy equal protection under the law.

Article 12

The following are the property of the state: the land and underground riches, mines, forests, waters, natural energy resources, transportation routes of national importance, means of rail transportation, posttelegraph-telephones, radio and television stations, cinematography.

Transfer or co-ownership of certain aforementioned property, with the exception of land, are permitted only on the basis of a law.

Article 13

The land is given for the use of juridical and physical persons. The manner of giving the land for use, with or without compensations, is stipulated by law.

Agricultural land may be used for other purposes only with the consent of the appropriate state organs.

Article 14

Cooperative property belongs to a group of workers who are joined together on a voluntary basis to carry out production, trade, services or other socially valuable activities.

Cooperative ownership can become another form of ownership according to regulations stipulated by law.

Article 15

The right to private ownership and to inherit private property are recognized and guaranteed by law.

Private initiative is free on the condition that it does not impair social interests.

Article 16

A foreign physical or juridical person can enjoy the right to ownership under conditions stipulated by law.

A foreign person has the right to conduct independent economic activity, to invest in the country's enterprises, to form joint enterprises or its own enterprises under conditions stipulated by law.

Article 17

Private property can be expropriated in extraordinary circumstances when the general interest cannot be served in any other way. Compensation is always given for the value of the item which is expropriated.

Disagreements arising as a result of expropriation are resolved by the courts.

Article 18

The protection of the land, the natural resources, the waters and the air from pollution is a duty of the state, the economic and social organizations and all citizens.

Article 19

The state is concerned with planning general economic and social activity, coordinating national and local interests, in order to satisfy the material and cultural needs of society and strengthen the independence and defense of the country.

Article 20

The state controls domestic and foreign trade.

Article 21

The entire economic and social life of the country are based on work. Work is the main source from which each citizen ensures the means of a livelihood.

Article 22

Juridical and physical persons are obliged to contribute to cover the expenses of society, according to their income.

The fiscal system is established by law.

Article 23

The Republic of Albania is a secular state.

The state respects freedom of religious faith.

The religious faiths are free and equal before the law. Their use for political purposes and for national division is prohibited.

Relations between the state and the religious institutions are regulated by law.

Article 24

The state protects the cultural values and cultural heritage of the people and is concerned with the overall national cultural development.

Chapter II**Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens****Article 25**

Citizens of the Republic of Albania are those who have Albanian citizenship according to the law.

No one can be deprived of his citizenship without his request.

Article 26

No restriction or privilege in regard to the rights and duties of citizens is recognized on account of gender,

race, color, nationality, language, political conviction, religious belief, education, social origin or position, and material situation.

Article 27

Women enjoy equal rights with men in regard to work, compensation, holidays, social security, education, in all socio-political activity, as well as in the family.

Article 28

The Republic of Albania guarantees to the national minorities the right to freely express, preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, or religious identity, to use their mother tongue and to teach it in school and to develop their culture in all its aspects.

Members of the national minorities have the right, without restriction, to make and keep contacts with each other within the country, and, outside the country, with citizens of the same nationality in other countries.

Any national privilege and inequality and any act which violates the rights of national minorities is contrary to the Constitution and is punishable by law.

Article 29

Citizens who reach the age of 18 years have the right to elect and to be elected to all the organs of state power.

The only persons excluded from the right to vote are those whose right has been taken away because they have committed a crime, those who have been judged by the court to be mentally incompetent, those who have been sentenced to deprivation of freedom, or those who have been arrested, by decision of the court or approval of the prosecutor.

Article 30

Citizens have the right to work. The state cares about their employment and takes measures for labor safety and for training workers.

Citizens have the right to choose and exercise their profession according to their capabilities and personal preferences.

If citizens who are in work relationships have their work interrupted for reasons not of their own doing they have the right to compensation to the extent specified by the law.

Citizens have the right to emigrate to work outside the country. The state is concerned with regulating emigration and protecting the rights of citizens who have emigrated.

Article 31

The trade unions, and the workers themselves, on the basis of regulations established by law, have the right to strike to protect their economic, social, and professional interests. Strikes for political purposes are prohibited.

Article 32

Citizens enjoy the right to rest after work. The work day and the work week and the paid annual vacation are regulated by law.

Vacation homes, houses of culture, and other centers of this kind are established for the workers.

Article 33

Workers in the cities and villages are provided the necessary material means of livelihood in their old age, in the case of sickness, and in case of loss of the ability to work.

The state gives special attention to disabled veterans of the National Liberation War, those disabled in defending the country, and people with work disabilities and creates conditions for their rehabilitation.

Minor children of those killed in the defense of the country are under the care of the state.

Article 34

The state guarantees to citizens the necessary medical services as well as medical treatment in the health centers of the country, free of charge.

Article 35

Marriage and the family are under the care and protection of the state and society.

Marriage is contracted before the competent state organs and is dissolved by them.

Parents are responsible for the upbringing and education of children. Children are duty bound to care for parents who are disabled and who lack the necessary means of livelihood.

Children born out of wedlock have the same rights and duties as children born from a marriage.

Children who have no parents and no support are raised and educated by the state.

Article 36

Mother and child enjoy special care and protection according to the law. Mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth. The state opens maternity homes and creches and kindergartens for children.

Article 37

Citizens have the right to private property.

Article 38

Citizens have the right to education.

Article 39

The state guarantees freedom of creativity in the field of science, technology, literature, and the arts, and is concerned with their development.

Author's rights are protected by law.

Article 40

Conditions are created for citizens to engage in physical culture and sports.

Article 41

Citizens have the right to move freely within the territory of the Republic of Albania. They have the right to choose or change their place of residence.

These rights can be restricted by law to avoid a danger which threatens public order, the defense of the country and public welfare, in order to prevent an epidemic or the consequences of a natural calamity, to prevent penal acts, and to implement penal sentences.

Citizens have the right to freely enter and leave the territory of the Republic of Albania. The restriction of this right is effected only by law, in specific cases, in order to defend national security, order, health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of other citizens.

Article 42

Citizens cannot be expelled from the territory of the Republic of Albania, except in cases specifically stipulated in international agreements, to which the Republic of Albania is a party.

Article 43

Citizens enjoy freedom of opinion and speech and the right to express and disseminate their opinions.

Article 44

Citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience. They have the right to believe in a religion or not to believe, to preach their religion or to engage in atheistic propaganda.

Article 45

The citizens have freedom to assemble, to meet, and to have public demonstrations in a peaceful manner and without weapons, according to the conditions defined by the law.

Article 46

Citizens are guaranteed the right to join various organizations which operate in the political, trade union, economic, and cultural area and in any other field in the country's life.

The activity of political parties is prohibited in military institutions and units of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and the diplomatic missions outside the country, and in the offices of the public prosecutor and investigator and the courts.

Article 47

Citizens have the right to participate in running state and social activity, in discussing the laws, and in referendums. They have the right to work in every state job on the basis of their professional skills.

Article 48

Citizens have the right to be informed about state, economic, social, and international issues, with the exception of matters, which, according to the law, are regarded as state secrets.

Article 49

The rights of citizens cannot be exercised in opposition to the order established by the Constitution. Their realization must not violate the rights of other citizens.

The exercise of any political activity directed against the freedom, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of the Republic of Albania or which, directly or indirectly, aims at the use of violence is prohibited.

Article 50

The citizen has the right to be free and to have personal security. The right to life is protected by law. No one can be deprived of his life arbitrarily.

Article 51

The state guarantees the inviolability of the individual.

No one can be arrested without the decision of the competent organ. A citizen who is detained has the right to appeal directly to the court against the decision on his arrest.

In specific cases, stipulated by law, the competent organs can detain a person for a maximum of three days.

Article 52

No one can be accused and sentenced for a penal act which, at the time it was committed, was not stipulated as such by law.

No one can be sentenced for a penal act without a verdict from the court. A citizen who is a defendant is considered to be innocent as long as his guilt is not proven by final court decision.

No one can be sentenced without being present at court, except for when it has been legally certified that the person is absent.

Article 53

The citizen's right to defend himself or to be defended by a lawyer in all phases of the penal process is recognized. The defense can be also carried out in other forms provided by law.

Article 54

The use of torture and any inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment is prohibited.

Article 55

A citizen who has been declared innocent or who has been unjustly deprived of his freedom has the right to rehabilitation, to the restoration of rights which have been violated, and to compensation.

Article 56

No one can be imprisoned or expelled, except in specific cases stipulated by law and only on the basis of a court decision.

Article 57

The home is inviolable. No one is permitted to enter another person's home without the approval of the respective person, with the exception of representatives of the competent state organs and under the conditions defined by law.

Article 58

The secrecy of correspondence and of other means of communication cannot be violated, except in cases where a crime has been committed, a state of emergency, or a state of war.

Article 59

Citizens have the right to make requests, complaints, comments, and proposals to the competent organs on personal, social, and state matters.

According to the conditions defined by law, citizens have the right to appeal to the competent court for compensation from the state or its officials for damage caused by the illegal activities of state organs and employees while exercising their duty.

According to the conditions defined by law, the citizens have the right to complain to the competent court about employees who commit injustices during the exercise of their duty.

Article 60

Citizens are obliged to respect and implement the Constitution and other laws.

Article 61

The defense of the homeland is the supreme duty and the greatest honor for all citizens.

Treason against the homeland is the most serious crime.

Article 62

Military service and permanent readiness to defend the homeland are the duty of all citizens.

Article 63

Albanian citizens residing abroad enjoy the care and protection of the state.

Article 64

The right to asylum in the Republic of Albania is given to foreign citizens and stateless persons who are persecuted because of their activity in the service of democracy and national and social liberation and in the service of the progress of science and culture.

Article 65

The rights and freedoms provided for Albanian citizens are guaranteed to foreign citizens and stateless persons.

Exceptions to these rights or their restriction are effected on the basis of the law.

Article 66

The specific rights and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution can be restricted or suspended only in cases of a state of emergency or of war according to and to the extent permitted by criteria defined by a special law.

SECOND PART

Chapter I

Higher Organs of State Power

A. The People's Assembly

Article 67

The People's Assembly is the highest organ of state power and the sole legislative organ.

The People's Assembly exercises sovereignty in the name of the people and the state, in the forms and within the limits stipulated in the Constitution.

Article 68

The People's Assembly has the following main powers:

1. It defines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state.
2. It approves and amends the Constitution and the laws, makes final decisions in regard to the conformity of the laws with the Constitution, and interprets the laws.
3. It approves the main indices of the plans for the economic and cultural development of the country and the state budget.

4. It decides on partial and general mobilization, a state of emergency, and a state of war in the case of armed aggression against the Republic of Albania or when it is necessary to fulfill the obligations deriving from international treaties.

5. It ratifies and denounces:

Treaties of a political nature;

Treaties or agreements of a military nature;

Treaties or agreements dealing with the borders of the Republic of Albania; Treaties or agreements dealing with the fundamental rights and duties of the citizens;

Treaties which result in financial obligations for the state;

Treaties or agreements resulting in changes in legislation;

Treaties or other agreements in which it is stipulated that their ratification or denunciation should be carried out by the People's Assembly.

6. It grants amnesty.

7. It decides on popular referendums.

8. It elects the President of the Republic of Albania.

9. It elects, appoints, and discharges the Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Council, and the Supreme Court and the Attorney General and his deputies.

10. It monitors the activity of the Council of Ministers and of the Office of the Attorney General.

11. It defines the territorial-administrative structure of the country. 12. It decides on the creation or dissolving of ministries.

Article 69

The People's Assembly consists of 250 deputies who are elected in constituencies with an approximately equal number of voters.

The People's Assembly is elected for a term of four years.

The People's Assembly is convened in its first session no later than two months from the date of the election.

The elections to the People's Assembly are held no later than three months from the date that its mandate ends.

In case of war or a state of emergency, the People's Assembly can extend its activity beyond the established term, as long as the war or the state of emergency continues.

Article 70

The People's Assembly elects its presidency which consists of a chairman and two deputy chairmen.

The activity of the People's Assembly and its Presidency is carried out in accordance with regulations which it has approved.

Article 71

The People's Assembly meets in sessions convened no fewer than four times a year.

The sessions of the People's Assembly are convened by decision of its Presidency. The Presidency is also obliged to convene a session of the People's Assembly when this is requested by the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, or one-third of the deputies.

The meetings of the People's Assembly begin when a majority of the deputies is present.

The meetings of the People's Assembly are open, except for specific cases when the People's Assembly decides otherwise.

Article 72

The People's Assembly elects permanent and temporary commissions from among its members.

In its first session, the People's Assembly elects a commission for the examination of the deputies' mandates. On the proposal of this commission, the People's Assembly certifies or invalidates the mandates of the deputies.

The permanent commissions have the task of examining the draft laws, as well as the decrees of a normative nature of the President of the Republic, following up and monitoring the activity of state organs according to the appropriate sectors, and forwarding problems to the People's Assembly or the Council of Ministers. The temporary commissions are created for specific issues.

Article 73

In his activity, the deputy of the People's Assembly has the obligation to conscientiously serve the people and the homeland. The rights and duties of the deputy are stipulated by law.

Article 74

The deputy of the People's Assembly enjoys immunity.

The deputy cannot be detained, arrested, or given a penal sentence without the approval of the People's Assembly, with the exception of cases in which he commits an evident and serious crime.

The deputy has no legal responsibility for expressing his opinions or for the votes he casts.

Article 75

The legislative initiative belongs to the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, and the deputies.

Laws and other acts of the People's Assembly are considered to be approved when the majority of the deputies present have voted for them.

Laws are proclaimed no later than 15 days after they are approved and they go into effect 15 days after their publication in GAZETA ZYRTARE, except for cases when they themselves make different provisions.

B. The President of the Republic of Albania

Article 76

The President of the Republic of Albania is the head of state and represents the unity of the people.

Article 77

The President of the Republic is elected by the People's Assembly for five years by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all the deputies. If the first vote does not provide the required majority, there is a second voting in which the President of the Republic is elected by the absolute majority of the votes of all the deputies.

The candidate for President is proposed to the People's Assembly by a group of deputies, no fewer than 30 people.

If there are more than two candidates running for the post of President of the Republic, the two candidates who received the most votes in the first balloting have the right to run in the second balloting. The candidate who wins the absolute majority of the votes of all the deputies is considered to be elected.

Article 78

Any Albanian citizen over 40 years of age who satisfies the conditions for being elected deputy can be elected President of the Republic.

The election of the President of the Republic takes place no later than 30 days before the expiration of the term of the previous President.

The same person cannot be elected President of the Republic more than twice in succession.

If the President of the Republic is elected from the ranks of the deputies, he gives up his position as a deputy.

Article 79

The President of the Republic cannot be removed before his term ends, except in the following cases:

a) when he has committed the crime of treason against the homeland or has intentionally violated the Constitution;

b) when his health does not allow him to carry out his duties;

c) when he resigns of his own volition.

Article 80

The President of the Republic has the following powers:

1. He ensures the observance of the Constitution and the laws and the rights and freedoms of the citizens.
2. He convenes the first session of the new legislature of the People's Assembly.
3. He sets the date for the elections of the People's Assembly and the people's councils.
4. He proclaims laws and referendums decided upon by the People's Assembly. 5. He has the right, within 15 days of the approval of a law by the People's Assembly, to send the law back for review, only once.
6. He proposes to the People's Assembly the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and accepts his resignation.
7. Between sessions of the People's Assembly and at the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he appoints and removes individual members of the Government. The President of the Republic presents this decree to the People's Assembly for approval at its next meeting.
8. At the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he appoints and removes directors of other central institutions.
9. He has the right, when he deems it necessary, to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers.
10. After consulting the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly, he can dissolve the People's Assembly prior to the expiration of the term of the legislature when its composition does not allow the Assembly to carry out its functions and makes it impossible to govern the country. In this case, People's Assembly elections are held once again no later than 45 days after the date of the dissolution.
11. He signs international treaties, ratifies, and denounces those which are not reviewed by the People's Assembly itself.
12. He appoints and removes diplomatic representatives, on recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
13. He accepts the credentials and the accreditations of diplomatic representatives of foreign states.
14. He grants Albanian citizenship and accepts its renunciation.
15. He exercises the right to pardon.
16. He awards decorations and titles of honor.
17. He gives the right to political asylum.

18. When the convening of the People's Assembly is impossible, he proclaims partial and general mobilization as well as a state of emergency. In these cases, the proclamation is presented to the People's Assembly for approval within five days.

19. When the convening of the People's Assembly is impossible, he proclaims a state of war in the case of armed aggression against the Republic of Albania.

20. He issues decrees of an individual nature and decisions; in urgent cases he issues decrees of a normative nature, which are presented to the People's Assembly for approval during its next session.

Article 81

Acts which the President of the Republic issues in carrying out his powers stipulated in points 11, 12, and 20 of Article 80 of this Constitution must be countersigned, on an ad hoc basis, by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or by the appropriate minister.

Article 82

When the position of President of the Republic is vacant for any reason, his powers are exercised temporarily by the Chairman of the Presidency of the People's Council, with the exception of those cases stipulated in points 5 and 10 of Article 80 of this Constitution.

Article 83

The President of the Republic is not responsible for acts committed while exercising his functions, with the exception of cases of treason against the homeland or intentional violation of the Constitution.

In such cases, the question of responsibility can be placed before the People's Assembly at the request of no fewer than one-fourth of the deputies. The respective decision is adopted by a two-thirds majority of the deputies.

Chapter II

A. Supreme Organs of State Administration

Article 84

The Council of Ministers (the Government) is the supreme executive and administrative organ.

The Council of Ministers is appointed at the first session of the People's Assembly.

In the first session of the People's Assembly and on any other occasion when the new Government is formed, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers presents to the People's Assembly the composition and program of the Government, seeking a vote of confidence.

If he does not receive a vote of confidence, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers immediately presents his resignation to the President of the Republic, who proposes a new Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Article 85

The deputies have the right to present, at any time, a motion of no confidence for the Council of Ministers or its individual members. The no confidence motion must be signed by at least one-tenth of the deputies and cannot not be reviewed by the People's Assembly until three days after it has been presented.

The failure of the People's Assembly to approve a proposal presented by the Government does not result in the obligatory resignation of the Government.

Article 86

The Council of Ministers has the following composition: chairman, deputy chairmen, ministers, and persons equal to them in status. The Council of Ministers can also include ministers without portfolio.

The Council of Ministers can also include persons who are not deputies. The Council of Ministers makes decisions by majority of votes, when a majority of the members is present.

Article 87

The Council of Ministers has the following main powers:

1. It directs the activity of carrying out the domestic and foreign policies of the state.
2. It issues decisions, orders, and instructions on the basis of the Constitution and of the laws for their implementation; they are signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and, when they are of a normative nature, they are published in GAZETA ZYRTARE, with the exception of certain cases stipulated by law.
3. It directs and monitors the activity of the ministries, other central organs of state administration, and executive committees of the people's councils and defines their structure.
4. It directs the activity for the execution of duties in the area of the defense of the country, in accordance with the decisions of the Defense Council.
5. It takes measures for the security, protection, and strengthening of the juridical system and of the rights of the citizens.
6. It concludes international agreements and approves and denounces those which are not subject to ratification.
7. It draws up the draft of the main indices of the plans for the economic and cultural development of the country and the draft budget of the state, organizes and controls the implementation of the plans and of the budget, and directs and organizes the state finances and the monetary and credit system.
8. It executes the apportionment of territorial-administrative units.

Article 88

The Council of Ministers abrogates the illegal or unjust acts of ministers and of other central organs of state administration.

Article 89

The Presidency of the Council of Ministers consists of the Chairman and the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers.

Upon the decision of the Council of Ministers, the Presidency can be charged with reviewing and resolving matters related to the economy and culture.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers represents the Council of Ministers, presides over its meetings, directs its overall activity and is responsible for it; he ensures the unity of the political and administrative orientation of the Government, coordinating the work of the ministries and other central institutions.

Article 90

The ministers direct the ministries in specified branches of activity. The ministers are responsible for the activity of the respective ministries and for the activity of the Council of Ministers.

In regard to issues which are within their jurisdiction, the ministers issue orders, rules, and instructions on the basis of the laws and of the orders and decisions of the Council of Ministers and for their implementation. The acts of the ministers which are of a normative nature are published in GAZETA ZYRTARE, except for specific cases stipulated by law.

Article 91

The ministers abrogate illegal or unjust orders and instructions of the organs, enterprises, and institutions under their jurisdiction.

Article 92

The members of the Council of Ministers are penally responsible for the violation of the Constitution and the laws regarding the exercise of their functions. Penal prosecution is carried out with the approval of the People's Assembly.

Chapter III**The Defense of the Country and the Armed Forces****Article 93**

The state safeguards the freedom, national independence, and territorial integrity of the country.

The territory of the Republic of Albania is inalienable and its borders are inviolable.

Article 94

The defense of the homeland and of the Constitutional order is insured by the Armed Forces which consist of the People's Army, the Forces of the Ministry of the Interior, and the territorial forces of people's defense.

Article 95

The Defense Council is created to direct, organize, and mobilize all the forces and resources of the country in defense of the homeland.

The President of the Republic of Albania is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Defense Council.

The composition of the Defense Council is stipulated by the People's Assembly, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Defense Council.

Article 96

No one has the right to sign or to accept, in the name of the Republic of Albania, the capitulation or occupation of the country. Such an act is treason against the homeland.

Chapter IV

Local Organs of State Power and Administration

Article 97

The people's councils are the organs of state power which govern in the respective territorial-administrative units.

The people's councils are concerned with the entire social life in the political, economic, and socio-cultural fields, with the defense of the country and the protection of the juridical order, reconciling local interests with general state interests.

The people's councils are elected for a three-year term.

Article 98

The people's council approves the main indexes of the plans for economic and cultural development and the budget in the respective territorial-administrative unit; from among its members, it elects and removes the executive committee and commissions of the council and it appoints and discharges the chiefs of sections and offices in the executive committee; it monitors the activity of people's councils at lower levels; it issues orders and decisions in areas where it has jurisdiction.

Article 99

The meetings of the people's council begin when a majority of members is present.

The people's council makes decisions by majority of votes of members present.

Article 100

A district people's council can be dissolved by decision of the People's Assembly, which appoints a temporary executive committee and decides on elections for a new people's council.

Dissolution takes place when:

1. The people's council has committed deeds which are in conflict with the Constitution or which represent serious violations of the law;

2. The people's council is not responsive to the request from the Government for the removal of the executive committee or of its individual members who have committed deeds such as those stipulated in point 1 of this article;

3. The people's council is not able to carry out its functions because it cannot form a majority for adopting decisions;

4. Changes are being made in the apportionment of territorial-administrative units.

For the same reasons, a higher level people's council can dissolve a lower level people's council or its executive committee, appoint a temporary executive committee, and decide on elections for a new people's council.

The people's council revokes illegal or unjust acts of its own executive committee, of the lower level people's council and of the respective executive committee.

Article 101

The members of the people's councils enjoy immunity within the territorial-administrative unit of the people's council. They cannot be detained, arrested, or subjected to penal prosecution without the consent of the people's council, except in cases when they commit a significant and serious crime.

Article 102

The executive committee is the executive and administrative organ of the people's council.

The executive committee submits its most important decisions to the people's council for approval and reports to it in regard to the implementation of the decisions of the people's council.

The executive committee continues its activity after the end of the term of the people's council which has elected it, until a new executive committee is elected.

Article 103

The executive committee of the higher level people's council; revokes the illegal or unjust acts of the lower level executive committee and suspends those of the lower level people's council, submitting the question of their abrogation to the competent people's council.

Article 104

The sections and offices created under the executive committees are under the jurisdiction of the people's council, its executive committee, and the highest organs of state administration.

Their orders and instructions can be abrogated by the people's council, the executive committee, the specialized organ in executive committee of the higher level people's council, and by the appropriate ministry.

Article 105

The structure and powers of the local organs of state government and administration are determined by law.

Chapter V**Organs of Justice****Article 106**

In the Republic of Albania, penal prosecution, investigation, and the trial process are separated and are carried on by separate organs.

Article 107

The courts are the organs which administer justice.

The organization of the courts and the trial procedure are defined by law. The creation of extraordinary courts is prohibited.

Article 108

The Supreme Court is the highest organ for the administration of justice.

The Supreme Court monitors the judicial activity of the courts. The Supreme Court issues judgements in the first and second instance in cases defined by law.

The Supreme Court issues judgements in the first instance in regard to penal acts committed, during the exercise of their duties, by the President of the Republic, the Chairman and members of the Council of Ministers, and the deputies.

In its plenary meeting, the Supreme Court:

1. Reviews the complaints of political parties and other organizations about failure to register or prohibition of their activity by the respective state organ. The decision is final;
2. Reviews complaints against the decisions of the Central Elections Commission in regard to the results of the elections. The decision is final.

Article 109

The courts judge penal and civil cases as well as administrative and other cases which, by law, are under their jurisdiction.

Article 110

The investigation office is the organ which carries out investigations of penal acts.

The organization and powers of the investigation office are defined by law.

Article 111

The Ministry of Justice directs and monitors the activity of judicial administration; it is concerned with the organization and operation of the courts which operate in the territorial-administrative units of the country and of the investigation office.

The organization and powers of the Ministry of Justice are defined by law.

Article 112

The prosecutor's office is the organ which carries out penal prosecution.

The prosecutor's office monitors the conformity with the Constitution and the laws of acts issued by the central organs of state administration, by local organs of state government and administration, and by enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

The organization and powers of the prosecutor's office are defined by law.

Article 113

The organs of justice are separated from other state organs and, in their activity, they are subject only to the Constitution and the laws.

The court and the prosecutor's office are independent in the exercise of their functions.

The prosecutors are independent of other local organs and are responsible only to the Attorney General, from whom they receive orders and instructions.

Court decisions can be amended only by the competent higher level court.

Article 114

The judgement is carried out with the participation of the assistant judges, in open session, with the exception of cases in which the law stipulates otherwise.

During the trial, the Albanian language is used. People who do not know Albanian may use their own language and speak through an interpreter.

The court pronounces its verdict in the name of the people.

Article 115

The Supreme Council of Justice is headed by the President of the Republic and is composed of the Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, the

Attorney General, and seven other jurists elected by the People's Assembly in the first session of each legislature upon recommendation of the President of the Republic.

The Supreme Council of Justice, by secret vote, appoints as vice chairman one of its members elected by the People's Assembly.

The Supreme Court of Justice appoints, transfers, and removes judges, investigators, and prosecutors, and takes disciplinary measures towards them.

The Supreme Council of Justice carries out its activity on the basis of the rules approved by it.

THIRD PART

Chapter I

The Constitutional Council

Article 116

The Constitutional Council consists of nine members, five of whom are elected by the People's Assembly and four of whom are appointed by the President of the Republic.

The Constitutional Council is elected for a five-year term.

The members of the Constitutional Council must be jurists, noted for their ability, who have practiced their profession for no less than 10 years in juridical activity or in juridical higher education.

The members of the Constitutional Council elect their chairmen by secret vote.

Article 117

The members of the Constitutional Council cannot be ministers, deputies, members of the people's councils, or members of political parties.

Article 118

The Constitutional Council:

1. At the request of the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, the Attorney General, or one-fifth of the deputies, reviews the conformity of the laws with the Constitution, presenting the appropriate recommendation to the People's Assembly. If the Constitutional Council recommends the abrogation of the law or of its individual provisions, the People's Assembly must express its opinion in regard to the decision of the Constitutional Council within two months; otherwise, the law or the individual provisions are invalid. The decision of the People's Assembly is issued on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the deputies present.

2. Makes a decision, at the request of the Council of Ministers, the Attorney General, or the district people's council, in regard to the conformity of legal acts with the

Constitution and with the law and the conformity of legal acts of low level organs with those of higher organs. The decision is final.

3. Reviews and resolves, by final decision, disputes between central and local organs of state government and administration in regard to powers.

Chapter II

The Emblem, the Flag, the Capital City

Article 119

The emblem of the Republic of Albania is a black, double-headed eagle, encircled by two sheaves of wheat with a five-pointed red star, which are tied at the bottom with a red ribbon, on which the date "24 May 1944" is inscribed.

Article 120

The state flag of the Republic of Albania presents a red background with a black double-headed eagle in the middle, above which there is a five-pointed red star, outlined in gold. The ratio between the width and the length of the flag is one to one and four-tenths.

Article 121

The Capital of the Republic of Albania Is Tirana.

Chapter III

Final Provisions

Article 122

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state.

All the activity for the creation of juridical norms is conducted in complete conformity with it.

Article 123

Drafts for amendments to the Constitution can be presented by the President of the Republic of Albania, the Council of Ministers, or two-fifths of the deputies.

The Constitution and amendments to it are approved by the People's Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all the deputies.

Article 124

This constitution goes into effect immediately.

Paper Extols Hoxha on Death Anniversary

AU1804183591 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 11 Apr 91 p 1

[Editorial: "Eternal Respect and Gratitude"]

[Text] We are today commemorating Enver Hoxha. This is the sixth April since he departed from his people and from the party that he founded and led. This is the sixth

April that we bow with profound respect in memory of this popular leader for everything that he did for his country and people, for our beloved Albania.

The current April is very special. Time has brought new political forces onto the scene, forces opposing the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh], its line, and the road traversed by Enver Hoxha. This is a historic moment that we have jointly brought about and that we must follow up jointly with a lofty sense of responsibility for the consolidation of the all-powerful democracy. In this great pluralist victory, at this political turning point, we again feel the presence of Enver Hoxha and his deeds, his valuable teachings, his analyses of the situation, and his dialectical thinking about the future. Thus, although the times have changed, Enver Hoxha's personality lives on fully and inviolate in the national consciousness. Any historical personality who does not become an obstacle to successive generations on the paths that they may choose in life and their aspirations must be a fortunate one. Enver Hoxha, thus, was such a personality.

What has remained of Enver Hoxha at this moment of considerable and profound changes? The dimensions of a historic personality are determined by his achievements, by the relationship that he has established with the period in which he lived, as well as with the future. History is partial to nobody. Sooner or later it determines everybody's place. Enver Hoxha, too, has his deserved place in the pantheon of Albanian history. It is precisely history that serves its own people best. The past 50 years of the PPSh, and Enver Hoxha's leadership for nearly half a century, are a component part of this history. This is his first and most important service to history, and we will never forget him for that.

Is it possible to forget that grave period of the country's occupation, when the very fate of this people was being questioned, when our partitioned Albania was once again at the crossroads? During all those heroic years it was Enver Hoxha who not only felt the pain of the occupation and the danger that threatened the very existence of the Albanian nation, but who also understood better and more clearly than anyone else the road to the future. That is why he became the founder and organizer of the only political force that placed itself at the head of the people and became their inspirer and organizer in the struggle for freedom and the establishment of the people's power. This was the party that reflected the vital interests of the masses, of the all-national interests. That is why it won their support. In its leader the masses saw the brave commander of the National Liberation Army, the courageous and cool leader, as well as the ardent patriot. Patriotism, this great and sacred sentiment of all Albanians, runs like a red thread through every day of Enver's life and every line of his works. That is why he will be honored forever. Comrade Ramiz Alia has written: "Enver Hoxha was an ardent patriot. He was permeated throughout with the distinguished patriotic traditions of our small nation that has suffered much. He fought with unprecedented

heroism, with weapons, with the pen, with his knowledge, and with his entire being to defend our socialist homeland, its independence and sovereignty, its national rights, and the dignity of the people and our socialist state."

The memory of our people cannot forget how the country had to be rebuilt from nothing and how the newly won power had to be defended at a time when it was the target of the most regressive forces from within and from outside. The new democratic order, the new democracy, the first democracy for the broad masses, for the workers and the peasants, the only correct and salvational alternative at the time, could not have been defended other than through the strictest dictatorship against those who plotted to stifle this new democracy. Otherwise we would not have had the people's power, we would not have all the achievements, and perhaps we would not have the borders of present-day Albania. Finally, we would not have had the opportunity of reaching, at this new and present stage, the victory of pluralist democracy. Enver Hoxha, too, has the place of honor in all this. Let us therefore call him the predecessor and, simultaneously, a coparticipant in these great events that are currently taking place in our midst.

The first concern of every leader is the progress of his own country. We are now in a position to judge what has been done and what could still be done. However, no clear mind can fail to admit that it was no easy matter at all to leave behind a medieval darkness and to progress rapidly toward the creation of an entire army of educated and cultured people, to train an army of knowledgeable people, from the ordinary engineer to the fully trained intellectuals, who are so numerous in production and in science, all of them trained in our own university as well as abroad. It is precisely this that became the determining factor in the rapid growth of a multibranched industry and advanced agriculture. The correct policy pursued by the PPSh and Enver Hoxha's particular solicitude in this question were of decisive importance. Can anyone fail to appreciate this contribution?

The world has produced many distinguished statesmen and able diplomats. Not a few of them have had the historical chance to determine not only the fate of nations and countries, but also to influence historical trends. Without making any comparisons, Enver Hoxha will remain in the history of the Albanian nation for his own role at decisive moments in this country's life. Enver Hoxha was one of the very few, if not the only one, to give the example of a true pluralist, when he dared proclaim to the world his own ideas, and that of his own party, on fundamental questions of its ideological line. He exposed the covert betrayals of false friends and allowed Albania neither to be made part of the maps of others nor to be turned into a prosperous garden with fortified shores that would have been a threat to its neighbors and Europe. It is not only Albania that appreciates this, but also Europe, regardless of how much it may raise its voice when it admits this undeniable truth. Our people supported these resolute and correct stands,

despite the fact that by so doing it burdened itself with economic consequences. It was not that our intelligent people did not know how to calculate. However, in the final analysis, every people, at all times, knows how to set its essential priorities clearly at particular moments in history. The Albanian people made a priority of what was most dear to them: the country's freedom and independence. Enver Hoxha's powerful links with the people, his knowledge of their psychology, as well as of their history and traditions, gave strength and dignity to his stand. This consistency was of decisive importance in the country's destiny. Is it possible not to be grateful to Enver Hoxha for this?

In what other ways do Enver's life and deeds serve us?

We have truly entered a new stage, a pluralist society, with considerable changes from the past. In Enver's theoretical thinking, one finds no ready made formulas and recipes. Such things have served no purpose in the past and even less at present, when it is not possible to lead through slogans and quotes. However, there is one valuable essential element that serves its purpose from any viewpoint. This is the dialectical view of society, phenomena, and the world. This dialectical way of viewing things, which is the major lesson that we must draw from Comrade Enver's deeds, served the PPSH and Comrade Ramiz Alia in judging events in the East and other developments, particularly in Europe. This dialectical view served them also to rely directly on a historic speech, as was the speech delivered in Mat almost 20 years ago, which was placed at the epicenter of the democratizing reforms within the party, beginning with its eighth plenum.

Nevertheless, not a few attacks have been directed recently against Enver Hoxha's name and deeds from the opposition or anticommunist theoreticians. These also prepared the ground for severe vandalistic actions against his monuments in various cities. These count among the most bitter moments of our pluralist democracy and will be remembered with a guilt complex for such attacks against a historic personality, but also against the sentiments of the people, their democratic culture, and civilization. These unprecedented and revolting attacks and acts were certainly intended to strike against the PPSH, to separate it from the people, to divide its ranks, to separate the leadership from the ranks. However, our wise, cultured, and restrained people did not fall into these traps. They rose like one in demonstrations of affection and respect for Enver Hoxha, for the party that he founded and led, and for Ramiz Alia as the leader and contemporary reformer, the genuine architect and builder of democratization. It is with the same clarity that the people went to the first pluralist elections and voted overwhelmingly for the PPSH candidates, for the most authoritative contemporary political force, for the party that initiated the democratizing reforms and is capable of leading them to conclusion in a calm and wise manner, without sickly excesses and passions, the party that is prepared to serve the interests of the people and only theirs.

We are progressing on a new path and will come across the unknown, the unexpected. Enver's life will help us along this path with the example of his profound devotion and dedication in giving his all and everything to the party, the people, and the country. He will help us with his example as an irreconcilable opponent of procrastination, sluggishness, routine thinking, bureaucracy, and degradation. He will help us through his unique experience in establishing contact with the people, in listening to their voice, and in the self-critical sense that characterized him whenever he found himself among the mass of the working people. This example is needed by all of us, now more than ever. However, this example assumes new values and we consider ourselves fortunate that Enver Hoxha did not leave behind closed paths on our way toward Europe. We do not need to apologize to anyone, we are not indebted to anyone, neither materially nor morally. It is with this dignity that Enver left us before the gates of Europe. For this, we are and will always be grateful to him.

BULGARIA

BZNS-NP Leader Drenchev on Moscow Visit

AU1804163791 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Apr 91
pp 1-2

[Interview with Milan Drenchev of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BZNS-NP) by Boyka Bashlieva in Sofia on 13 April: "The Success of Our Moscow Meetings Was the Restored Confidence"]

[Excerpts] Milan Drenchev, leader of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP] made the following statement upon his return from Moscow on Saturday, 13 April 1991: "The restored confidence in us was the greatest success of our visit." Mr. Drenchev was a member of the Bulgarian parliamentary delegation, headed by Academician Nikolay Todorov, chairman of the Grand National Assembly, to the Soviet Union. It was his first visit to the USSR.

Our visit was quite necessary and timely, considering that our colleagues from other East European countries paid such visits a long time ago, Mr. Drenchev pointed out in his statement to journalists at Sofia Airport.

I was surprised to learn that the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria was not entirely positive before to our visit. Certain circles in the USSR were convinced that we have given up our friendship with the Soviet Union, presuming that we considered it unnecessary. I am satisfied that this opinion changed after our talks.

The problem of the Bulgarian workers in Komi had reached a deadlock because of the workers' strike, which the Soviet side regarded as taking place with the blessing of the Bulgarian authorities. We dispelled such suspicions and agreed on a positive settlement of this problem. [passage omitted]

Answering the question of whether the possibility of a visit to the Soviet Union by Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev was discussed, Mr. Drenchev replied that there is not yet enough courage for this in our country, and that, furthermore, the delegation was not authorized to discuss this subject.

Nikola Petkov BZNS Congress Opens 19 Apr

*AU1904203591 Sofia BTA in English 2001 GMT
19 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 19 (BTA)—The 26th regular Congress of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-Nikola Petkov (BANU-Nikola Petkov) [Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BZNS-NP)] a member of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), was opened here today. This is the union's first congress in 58 years. The delegates will discuss and adopt the program and the statute of the BANU-Nikola Petkov which was restored in 1989.

Today BANU-Nikola Petkov leader Mr. Milan Drenchev presented a political report in which he raised again the question of the two agrarian parties' concurrent existence: The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) and the BANU-Nikola Petkov. According to Mr. Drenchev, their unification is impossible because before November 10, 1989 there was no other political party except the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and the BANU did not exist as an independent political force. Mr. Drenchev said that after November 10 the BANU gravitated now to the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] (former BCP), now to the opposition, its primary concern being to stay in power. The agrarians should really unite, Mr. Drenchev said, having in mind the rank and file of the two unions.

In Mr. Drenchev's report the BSP was referred to as an "opponent." He said that this party should assume the responsibility for the activities of its predecessor, the BCP, pointing out that the BSP's allies who discredited the Agrarian Union should also be answerable together with it.

Local and general elections are forthcoming, our opponents (BSP) are still powerful, the opposition should make no more mistakes, Mr. Drenchev said and called upon the delegates to consider "how and in what conditions the elections should be held."

Chanting "unity" the delegates applauded the message of greetings of Mr. Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the UDF, and of Dr. Petur Dertliev, chairman of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP). (The BSDP and the BANU-Nikola Petkov formed a centrist UDF faction last week.)

Mr. Nikodim Popov, organizational secretary of the BANU-Nikola Petkov, said in his report that at the moment the union has over 100,000 members organized in about 2,500 local groups throughout the country. No

details were given as to the social composition of the union and the age of its members.

The delegates at the congress are 2,000, most of them being over 60 years of age.

Assembly To Debate Alleged Informers List

*AU2404112391 Sofia BTA in English 1038 GMT
24 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 24 (BTA)—At an extraordinary sitting today the Bulgarian Parliament will continue to seek a way out of the affair over the files of informers of the former State Security Thought Police Department.

The scandal which shook parliament erupted unexpectedly after the "FAKS" daily carried a list of 32 names.

Ignoring the agenda, yesterday MP's on this sensational list gave explanations to parliament.

The stormy debate continued past midnight. About the end of the sitting the Bureau moved a resolution: to have the files burned by May 15 according to a procedure determined by parliament, to consider all published lists of informers unlawful and false and to hold their publishers criminally liable.

However, there is another motion on the files: to have them frozen for a certain period of time and legally invalidated.

The bickering on files and informers will probably last for quite a time and will be hard to settle. Moreover, after yesterday's statement by the chairman of the commission of inquiry Mr. Georgi Tambuev, the minister of the interior Mr. Danov refuses to guarantee the authenticity of the information which the commission obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One of the names, the deputy chairman of parliament Mr. Ivan Glushkov, should not have been put on the list. Mr. Danov had been misled by an officer. (The rumors that the minister, who is an independent, intends to resign, have not been confirmed so far.)

The files scandal is further complicated by yesterday's statement of a former State Security employee aired by the Bulgarian Television. He said that immediately after November 10, 1989 when Zhivkov was deposed, he himself was ordered to destroy classified documents.

The scandal which blocked the work in parliament yesterday makes its life extremely difficult. For a month now opposition leaders have been addressing rallies with persistent demands for new elections.

Ex-Envoy Prosecuted, Others Removed From Posts

AU2404182091 Sofia BTA in English 1659 GMT
24 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 24 (BTA)—The General Prosecutor's Office has initiated legal proceedings against Mr. Dimitur Romanov, Bulgaria's former ambassador in Lusaka, for embezzlement amounting to about 33,000 U.S. dollars, it was announced today at a briefing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following former ambassadors were also removed from office: Toncho Chakurov (Prague), Petur Mezhdurechki (Berlin), Georgi Karamanev (Athens) and Aleksandur Atanasov (Zimbabwe); Trifon Pashov, consul general in Leningrad, and Lyubomir Shopov, former head of the Balkan Countries Department of the Foreign Ministry were dismissed as well. The above-mentioned officials held other important posts under the former regime.

Incident at Sandanski, Aleksandrov Celebrations

AU2104175191 Sofia BTA in English 1651 GMT
21 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 21 (BTA)—Supporters of different political ideas gathered yesterday in the Rozhen area to mark the anniversaries of two outstanding figures in Bulgaria's modern history, Yane Sandanski and Todor Aleksandrov, who championed the liberation and unification of Bulgarians in Macedonia.

Thousands of people gathered at the national celebration of Todor Aleksandrov's 110th birth anniversary and Yane Sandanski's 76th death anniversary, organized by the major political forces. In his speech Prof. Dr. Dobrin Michev MP, a historian, described Macedonism as "the most insidious and poisonous weapon devised by pan-Serbian chauvinism, encouraged by the Comintern, and by the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria."

The Ilinden separatist organization, unrecognized in this country, was represented by some one or two hundred adherents and their guests from the United States and the Republic of Macedonia. The supporters of Macedonism made a stage not far from the official one and displayed once again the Ilinden's anti-Bulgarian purpose and separatist ideas. The people around shouted back "Serbomaniacs," "hirelings," "traitors." A cordon of police separated the two groups.

The only incident flared up as Mr. Petur Beron MP tried to argue with supporters of the Ilinden who reduced the argument to fisticuffs. The police prevented a possible clash.

Among the many wreaths and flowers laid at Yane Sandanski's grave, there was a written message by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) in Skopje headed by Mr. Ljubco Georgievski. "Down with Tito's and Georgi Dimitrov's communism and socialism, we are looking forward to help and support from Bulgaria and of patriotic Macedonians the

world over," the message said, signed by "a group of genuine Bulgarians from Ohrid, from Macedonia."

"I am surprised at the fact that in the declaration on its guilt the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) makes no mention of the coercive Macedonization of Bulgarians in Pirin Macedonia in the period 1945-1947 and even later on," said Mr. Todor Mishev, one of the leaders of the VMRO-Macedonian Youth Society.

Meanwhile, yesterday a member of the Supreme Council of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] told a BTA reporter on condition of anonymity that experts of the Socialist Party have worked out an official declaration on the guilt of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) in the so-called Macedonization of Bulgarians in Pirin Macedonia. The document will be published by the end of April.

Strike Action in Maritsa East Ridiculed

AU2504105091 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 Apr 91
p 1

[Report by Vanyo Stoilov from Radnevo: "Podkrepa's Strike Balloon Bursts"]

[Text] In today's issue of Podkrepa's publication, it was reported that only a few persons took part in the one-hour strike at Maritsa East, where about 22,000 work.

In the opinion of Georgi Ivanov, secretary of the territorial union Podkrepa, the action was something like a check on whether people were ready for action—so people could make sure that they could stand up for their demands. And the demands are that 58 of the plant's managers hand in their resignations. In Mr. Ivanov's opinion, the demands of the organizers were justified. However, no one at Podkrepa's Radnevo Headquarters could say how many people took part in the strike because their telephone lines were blocked and they did not have any information.

It became clear, from well-informed sources, that 70 persons at the Troyanovo North Colliery had said they would strike. At the Maritsa East-2 Power Plant, three persons had been seen with blue ribbons [the SDS color], and, at the Dimo Dichev Power Plant, one. Khristo Mukhtarov, the director of Troyanovo-1 Colliery, received an apology that he had been included in the resignation list without Podkrepa's agreement at the colliery. There was no strike at the central repair plant or at Thermo-Electric Power Plant-1.

Despite expectations in Radnevo, the chairman of Podkrepa's National Strike Committee did not turn up, which has been taken as an indication that the central leadership of the syndicate is not in agreement with the action and has left Podkrepa in Radnevo to sort itself out.

According to sources close to the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], Deputy

Premier Dimitur Ludzhev had reacted strongly to the attempt to cause unrest at Maritsa East.

Up until now, talks between the leadership of the Committee for Energetics, the Maritsa East Economic Association, and Podkrepa have not taken place on the question of the resignations or strikes, despite the fact that there were representatives from all of these organizations in the town today. Rusi Danev, chairman of the Economic Association Maritsa East, said that no one at Podkrepa in the capital had responded to his invitation for a meeting.

At Maritsa East, it is rumored that a list has already been prepared of possible candidates for the managerial posts freed by the resignations. Up until now, however, none of the present 58 economic managers has handed in his notice, nor do they have any intention of doing so.

BTA: Communist Regime Secretly Rewarded Agents

*AU2304195791 Sofia BTA in English 1838 GMT
23 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 23 (BTA)—Under the veil of secrecy the totalitarian communist regime used to confer distinctions on Interior Ministry employees and secret agents without legal justification.

For years on end the former State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria issued classified decrees on the conferment of orders without legal grounds. Competent legal scholars say some of the decrees are even invalid as statutory acts because both the decrees themselves and the honoured persons' identity were classified.

The classified decrees were invariably signed by Todor Zhivkov, at that time head of state and general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and by Nikola Manolov, secretary of the State Council.

An investigation conducted by BTA reporters found that there is only one way to explain the classification of these decrees: The distinctions were conferred for operations of the political police.

For instance, on October 24, 1978, Zhivkov signed a decree conferring orders on fourteen Interior Ministry employees. The Decree No. 1,857 says that the orders were conferred for "activism, operative skills and responsibility displayed in detecting, documenting and neutralizing the criminal activities of persons in service of foreign intelligence agencies and in neutralizing the seditious activities of Bulgarian citizens."

Whether by accident or design, the decree stamped "secret" was issued 45 days after the death in mysterious circumstances of the Bulgarian writer Georgi Markov in London.

The State Council systematically violated a provision of a document which it itself issued together with the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party

in 1974 and entitled "General Principles of the Standardized System of Moral Incentives." According to this document, "the use of the various moral incentives should be given broader publicity by publishing the respective acts in the Official Gazette, the national and the local press and all other media."

Secret agents of the political police also received decorations.

On June 27, 1979, Zhivkov signed a classified Decree No. 1,024 conferring the Order of Cyril and Methodius Second Class to an agent alias Hector. The citation says that "Hector showed conscientiousness and selflessness in major security service operations leading to the retrieval of valuable political and operative information."

Under the 1974 Decree on Moral Incentives, the Order of Cyril and Methodius was supposed to be awarded to "scientists, educationalists, cultural and public figures for long and loyal work in the sphere of science, education and culture and for contribution to the patriotic education of the Bulgarian people and chiefly of young Bulgarians in the spirit of communism."

Under Decree No. 2,332 dated December 18, 1979, an agent alias Atanas was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour for "a prolonged service to the Ministry of the Interior, for scientific and journalist work, for exposing the subversive activities of imperialism and for the education of young Bulgarians in the spirit of patriotism, love and respect for the Ministry of Interior authorities."

According to the Decree on Moral Incentives, this order was supposed to be conferred on "discoverers, inventors, innovators, organizers, managers and workers for high performance and great successes in meeting socio-economic development plan targets or for special achievements in state, public, scientific and cultural life."

Under classified Decree No. 1,493 dated September 7, 1979, an agent alias Delon was awarded the Order of the Red Banner "for long fruitful service to the Ministry of Interior authorities and for obtaining information of great importance for the scientific and technological progress in various economic spheres and particularly on military matters."

Other classified decrees are kept on record, too. Interior Ministry employees were awarded orders for "special skill in the organization and performance of intelligence and technical operations in the struggle against the enemy," or for "resourcefulness, inventiveness and operative skill in the detection, arrest and exposure of the authors of anti-communist leaflets."

The BTA has learnt that such decrees, which are presumably related to preliminary proceedings under way, will be submitted to the Prosecutor's Office.

Cabinet Approves Regulations To Apply Land Act

*AU2504162191 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1524 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] At its session today, the government adopted the regulations to apply the Law on Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land. The government considered a report on the preparatory work carried out in connection with applying the Land Act and examined the condition of the agricultural crops and the progress of the spring sowing work.

The government also examined a decision on the storage and use of archive documents of the political parties in the State Archives.

The Council of Ministers approved the proposal for changes in the statute of the Rila Monastery.

Finance Minister Ivan Kostov presented a memorandum at the session.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Draft of Treaty Between Republics Presented

*91CH0444A Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK
in Slovak 8 Mar 91 p 4*

["Text" of Proposal by the Christian Democratic Movement for Issuing a Constitutional Law of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council on a State Treaty Between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic]

[Text] Reaching out to our society, we are publishing the full text of the proposal by the Christian Democratic Movement for issuing a constitutional law of the Czech National Council [CNR] and the Slovak National Council [SNR] on a state treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in the form in which representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] presented it to President Vaclav Havel and a representative of the partnership coalition of political forces. This is a working proposal of the KDH and for the time being does not contain a concrete delineation of the extent of authority which the republics will yield to the federation. Therefore Chapter Four will be supplemented by the authorities which will fall under the jurisdiction of the CSFR, specifically in Articles 3, 5, 7, 9, and 15.

Introduction

We, the Czech nation and the Slovak nation, starting from the right of self-determination up through succession and respecting the sovereignty of each nation and its right to choose freely the ways and forms of national and state life:

—Thus create the sovereign and independent national states of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic;

—At the same time valuing the decades of our joint state life, but expressing the need for modification of our mutual relations to a more precisely delimited basis;

—Also declaring in a program out willingness to join in the integration process with a goal of proceeding to a legally equal participation of our republics in the integrational groupings of the society of European nations;

—Being represented by our deputies in the Czech National Council and in the Slovak National Council who are the highest representation of the citizens of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have decided to modify our mutual state relations by this treaty between our republics in the form of a joint (see Chapter 7, Article 1, paragraph 1 below) constitutional law of the CNR and the SNR.

The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council assert their right to conclude a state treaty and through it to decide on the restructuring of the joint federal state and on the extent of its jurisdiction regarding the rights of the peoples for self-determination recognized by international law, the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms, as well as in the constitutional law No. 143/1968 on the Czechoslovak Federation, which in its introduction recognizes the legal right of the national councils to conclude the basic agreement on forming a state.

Therefore the CNR and the SNR decree that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have agreed to this state treaty:

Chapter One

Parties to the Treaty

Article 1

(1) The parties to the treaty are the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are the sovereign republics of the Czech and Slovak nations, as well as of the citizens of other nationalities. Both republics independently determine their own state organization, territorial administrative divisions, and systems of state agencies through their own constitutional laws and other laws.

(3) The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic recognize the inalienable right of each nation to self-determination and to independent decisionmaking on questions of their own development.

Article 2

(1) The Czech Republic is represented by its supreme agency of state power, the Czech National Council, in concluding this state treaty.

(2) The Slovak Republic is represented by its supreme agency of state power, the Slovak National Council, in concluding this state treaty.

(3) The constitutional law of the Czech Republic and the constitutional law of the Slovak Republic can change the titles of the supreme agencies of state power within whose legal authority it is to conclude and to change the state treaty.

Chapter Two

The Agreement on Federation

Article 1

The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic by this, their sovereign decision, voluntarily express their mutual willingness to form the joint federal state of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Article 2

(1) The basis for the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] is the voluntary obligation of the legally equal national states of the Czech and Slovak nations and their citizens of national minorities.

(2) The CSFR is made up of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Both Republics have an equal position under the law in the CSFR.

(3) Both Republics mutually respect each other's sovereignty and the sovereignty of the CSFR as well, and likewise the CSFR respects the sovereignty of the national states.

Article 3

(1) The CSFR is established on the principles of democracy.

(2) The basic rights and freedoms of the citizens and the guarantees for exercising them are the same throughout the territory of the CSFR.

Article 4

(1) The territory of the CSFR is made up of the territories of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) The borders of each of the two republics can be changed only by a constitutional law of the appropriate national council.

(3) If a change in the border of a national republic is simultaneously a change in the CSFR border, then a constitutional law of the Federal Assembly is also necessary for the change.

Article 5

The property of the CSFR is state-owned property which serves to ensure performance of its tasks in the fields entrusted to its jurisdiction by the state treaty.

The remaining state-owned property belongs to the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Article 6

(1) A state citizen of each of the two Republics is likewise a state citizen of the CSFR.

(2) A citizen of one Republic has the same rights and the same obligations on the territory of the other Republic as a citizen of the other republic.

(3) No one can be deprived of his state citizenship against his will.

Article 7

(1) The official languages in dealings of the CSFR agencies and in announcing laws and other generally binding regulations are the Czech language and the Slovak language.

(2) Both official languages are used on an equal legal basis.

Chapter Three

Assignment of Partial Sovereignty

Article 1

The parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, voluntarily assign part of their own sovereignty to the CSFR.

Article 2

(1) The CSFR is a sovereign federal state created as a result of the voluntary assignment of part of the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) The CSFR exercises its state power within the boundaries of the authority entrusted to it by the parties to the treaty.

Article 3

The CSFR exercises its state power within the extent of its jurisdiction in a sovereign manner. Its acts are not subject to approval by the Republics' agencies.

Article 4

Matters which are not entrusted to the jurisdiction of the CSFR by this state treaty belong in the jurisdiction of the parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Article 5

(1) The CSFR exercises its state power to the extent delineated by this state treaty through the federal state agencies.

(2) The CSFR Constitution establishes the system of CSFR state agencies and the relationship between them.

Chapter Four

The Extent of Assigned Sovereignty (Delimiting the Jurisdiction of the Federation)

Part 1. Legislative Jurisdiction

Article 1

The parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, assign part of their legislative authority to the CSFR. The delimiting of the extent of that authority is established by this state treaty.

Article 2

(1) Within the area of exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the CSFR, the Federal Assembly approves constitutional laws and laws valid for and effective in the entire territory of the CSFR.

(2) The CNR or the SNR can declare for an exception prior to the approval of a proposed law within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSFR and request that it be reworked and a new proposal submitted. In such cases the Federal Assembly will stop discussing the proposal and return it to its sponsor. He can submit it again.

(3) If it concerns a proposal for a constitutional law, to apply an exception a national council needs a declaration by the qualified majority of votes necessary for approving constitutional laws; otherwise, a majority of more than half of the deputies present will suffice.

(4) A negative vote of a majority applies for votes in the Federal Assembly on proposals for laws within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSFR.

Article 3

The exclusive jurisdiction of the CSFR includes:

Article 4

(1) In the area of concurrent legislative action, the CSFR has the right to issue laws up until the time and to that extent that the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic do not utilize their right to issue laws.

(2) If the right to issue a law in the area of concurrent legislative action is utilized by the CSFR and one of the parties to the treaty, the law of the pertinent national council is valid on the territory of that party and the CSFR law is valid on the territory of the other party.

(3) The position of the national councils on the proposal for laws in the area of concurrent legislative action is not requested before approval in the Federal Assembly.

Article 5

The area of concurrent legislative action includes:

Part 2. Execution of CSFR Laws and the Federal State Administration

Article 6

The parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, assign part of their executive authority to the CSFR. The limitations on the extent of this authority are established by the state treaty.

Article 7

The jurisdiction of the CSFR includes:

Part 3. Finances

Article 8

The parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as well as the CSFR, are independent and not mutually dependent in their financial management.

Article 9

The jurisdiction of the CSFR in the area of finance includes:

Part 4. The CSFR Courts and Prosecutors

Article 10

The jurisdiction of the CSFR judicial agencies includes:

(a) decisions on recognizing the decisions of foreign courts on CSFR territory;

(b) in cases set by law on proceedings before courts and before state notary's offices, it determines the appropriate courts and state notary's offices;

(c) courts martial.

Article 11

Procurator agencies of the CSFR perform oversight over the execution and preservation of the laws and other legal regulations of the federal agencies of the state administration.

Part 5. Protection of the Federal Constitutionality

Article 12

The basic goal of protecting the federal constitutionality is ensuring the functioning of the legal state, harmony of the legal acts with the CSFR Constitution and other constitutional laws of the Federal Assembly, and also maintaining the extent of the jurisdiction of the federation as established by this state treaty.

Article 13

(1) If a protective agency for the federal constitutionality discovers a conflict between the constitutional law of a

national council and the constitutional law of the Federal Assembly, it suspends the application of the norms accepted latest and draws attention to the conflict.

(2) If the appropriate legislative agency does not resolve the conflict within six months of being advised of it by the protective agency for the federal constitutionality in accordance with paragraph 1, the conflict will be resolved by means of the compromise procedures of the national councils which can lead to a proposal for a change or a supplement to the state treaty.

(3) Details of the compromise procedures are established by a constitutional law of the Federal Assembly.

Part 6. The Head of State

Article 14

(1) The head of the CSFR is the president. He fulfills the office of CSFR head of state to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Federation as established by this state treaty.

(2) The method of election, relationships to other federal agencies, terms of office, and other details are established by the CSFR Constitution.

Article 15

The jurisdiction of the head of state of the Federation includes:

Chapter Five

Changes in the Extent of Assigned Sovereignty (Changes in the Federation Jurisdiction)

Article 1

(1) Effecting changes in the extent of sovereignty assigned to the Federation is an expression of the original sovereignty of the parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) Effecting changes in the jurisdiction of the federation is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Article 2

(1) Changes in the jurisdiction of the federation can be effected only by a change in or an addition to the state treaty in the form of a joint constitutional law of the CNR and the SNR.

(2) A change in the jurisdiction of the federation goes into effect after approval by both national councils by the qualified majority of votes necessary for the approval of constitutional laws.

(3) A proposal for changes in the jurisdiction of the federation approved only by the CNR or only by the SNR is not valid.

Chapter Six

Unilateral Withdrawal from the Treaty

Article 1

(1) Unilateral withdrawal from this treaty is an implementation of the rights of self-determination.

(2) Unilateral withdrawal from this treaty means leaving the CSFR. The further existence of the parties to this treaty is the existence of independent states or another state form. In this case the CSFR ceases to exist.

Article 2

(1) Unilateral withdrawal from this treaty is possible only on the basis of a qualified majority of votes of the citizens of the parties to the treaty, the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic, cast in a referendum called by a proclamation of the national council.

(2) Particulars are specified in laws issued by the National Councils.

Chapter Seven

Transitional and Closing Provisions

Article 1

(1) This state treaty goes into effect on the day when its entire text is approved by the CNR and the SNR by the qualified majority necessary for the approval of a constitutional law. After its approval it becomes the joint constitutional law of the CNR and the SNR.

(2) A proposal for a state treaty approved only by one national council is a constitutional law on a proposal for a state treaty. The state treaty is concluded on the day that its entire text is approved by the CNR and the SNR.

(3) Each proposal for change by either national council represents a new proposal for a state treaty and requires approval by the CNR and the SNR.

Article 2

(1) The constitutional law on a state treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic is the legal norm of the highest legal power in the CSFR.

(2) This constitutional law is a component part of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

(3) On the basis of the state treaty created by this constitutional law and to the extent of the jurisdiction established by it, the Federal Assembly will approve the CSFR Constitution.

(4) The CSFR Constitution must contain an abrogation provision for all provisions of previous constitutions and constitutional laws which are in conflict with the provisions of this state treaty.

Article 3

(1) Changes and additions to the state treaty can be effected only in the manner in which the state treaty is approved.

(2) Unilateral changes and additions to the state treaty are excluded. An exception is allowed by the provisions of Chapter Six on unilateral withdrawal from the treaty.

(3) Expansion of the number of parties to the treaty requires the conclusion of a new state treaty.

Article 4

This constitutional law on the state treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic will take effect on.....

Havel's Significance for Nation Assessed

91CH0487A Prague KVETY in Czech 1 Mar 91 pp 4-7

[Article by Ladislav Hejdanek: "A Playwright or a Politician?"]

[Text] In the entire political history of our republic to this day we had only three presidents whom we may consider democratically elected and supported by the majority of our people and with their intrinsic approval. None of them was a professional politician, although the first two had been for a long time involved with politics both in theory and praxis. The political accomplishments of all three are undeniable, but without any doubt it is obvious at first sight that all of them were first introduced both to our society and above all, to the world in a different—that is, their specific—field. This applies the least to Edvard Benes, possibly because he became involved in politics at a relatively young age. In addition, he did so as a very close coworker of Masaryk to whom he was devoted and according to whose concepts he articulated and developed Czechoslovakia's foreign policy over the years. Masaryk himself lacked such support during his first political engagement. He soon realized that he was not adequately prepared for real political action and therefore, he left the political arena for a while. In this context we should not forget that, in comparison not only with the past years of our former system but also with current conditions, the political situation and the whole atmosphere in Austria-Hungary in the 1880's and 1890's were far more favorable and so to say, more normal. Masaryk was able to focus his political thought and concepts on the Old Czech and the Young Czech movements which, after all, had more political experience; he studied the development of the student and the Omladina associations, of the progressive movement, and so on; he presented his views in journals and newspapers, and later he published them in his books. Thus, he was prepared for his work in the time of war better than the overwhelming majority of professional politicians of those days. Nevertheless, both

he and Benes were intellectuals and remained so in their political activity into which they had plunged with such fervor.

It is only now that we have our third president of that order. There is no doubt that he was far less prepared for his sudden entry into professional politics than either of his above-named predecessors. Of course, his current coworkers, partners and opponents are incomparably less professional as well. He, too, is an intellectual, albeit of a somewhat different stripe; although quite dissimilar, both Masaryk and Benes were university professors: surprisingly enough, Masaryk was a singular man of action, while Benes was more of a negotiator and diplomat. I am not quite sure if Havel is completely devoid of some didactic talent. It is possible that he may yet discover certain genes of that sort, even though in all probability, they never had adequate opportunity to manifest themselves. However, he has demonstrated his intellectualism on many occasions, naturally, mostly in his creative work and sometimes also in various discussions with journalists, in his declarations, petitions, correspondence—and last but not least, in his letters from prison. Some time ago already I had the opportunity to express my regret that he had not pursued studies of philosophy. To be sure, I feel that he has an undeniable political talent but that it remains buried like the proverbial talents from parables. On the whole, it seems that Vaclav Havel was blessed with an unusually far-reaching and multifaceted talent. I consider it to some extent a fluke that he earned his reputation in our country and in the world first as a playwright. And in the same way, I consider it a fluke that today the world knows him as Czechoslovak president and the leading spirit of the so-called velvet revolution so greatly admired mainly from a distance.

In younger years I and my friends used to play a parlor game called "What would happen if ..."; most people probably know it, perhaps under some other name. As in that game, a slightly different question occurs to me: What would Vaclav Havel be if he were a chemical element? I think that he would have to be carbon. It is precisely carbon that may be combined—spontaneously or by means of other elements—with a considerable number of additional elements as well as with itself into many diverse compounds, and thus, it can produce new chemical substances and open for chemistry further opportunities which few people in the past could even imagine. It can do that both on a small and on a large scale; it can form simple as well as enormously complex molecules; it likes experimentation; many of its compounds have been unsuccessful, some are outright failures good for almost nothing, while others are full of imagination and surprising properties and even of real life. We cannot imagine real life without carbon. As a matter of fact, carbon itself has several forms that seem at first glance quite dissimilar. Of course, a chemist knows methods of its identification, but how can any uninformed person recognize it if it appears once in the form of graphite, then of a diamond and sometimes of

soot? For a long time Havel's multivalent creative propensity used to astonish me; for the first time it came to me very clearly as I read his "anticodes" in 1965 when he began to cooperate with TVAR. From the beginning all his creative output was marked with one important trait, namely, his unusually well developed feeling for absurdity. After all, there, too, can one see the similarity with carbon and with the development of the most varied types of living entities and their frequently strange forms of coexistence.

Nevertheless, no matter how everything could have turned out under different circumstances, the fact is that Vaclav Havel became an outstanding playwright of world renown. That cannot be changed by the equally indisputable fact that his reputation was considerably enhanced by political developments in our country and abroad. His life as a playwright was just as stressful as his life as a human being (and in that he was not alone): for two decades neither was he able to attend performances of his plays in theatres abroad, nor could his plays be staged in his own country. However, even during that extremely inauspicious period he managed to write several plays, although much of his time was spent in pursuit of his political (dissident) activities or in prison. If he did not happen to be imprisoned at a particular moment, no major event of far-reaching political significance—protests against trials of young musicians, Charter 77, VONS [Committee for Defense of Unjustly Persecuted], etc.—would take place without him. On many occasions he acted all by himself at a time when all others were just beginning to catch their breath after the shock caused by the occupation. It is axiomatic that he could not remain on the sidelines when the 40-year deprivation of our entire society was coming to an end. The developments of the past several years and above all, of the events in our country in late 1989, resulted in the breakdown of the Husak-Jakes regime and in an initially enthusiastic start of a new era for our entire society. For many people it meant that at long last they would be able to resume their original work; a great many young people gained freedom to choose their field of work and particularly of study; of course, for considerable numbers of others nothing much had changed, except for the opening of new vistas of political freedom. Unfortunately, that freedom was absent over 50 years and so anything resembling it became no more than remote abstraction because the democratic consciousness and conscience of many citizens had been systematically stupefied. For Vaclav Havel it turned out to be a very absurd situation: Now he has even less time for his dramatic work and for writing in general than in the past 20 years, during the so-called times of dissent. On the other hand, he is now president.

To savor this absurdity, we must first free ourselves from the prejudices and false priorities that had been penetrating common consciousness over a long time and in fact were somewhat linked with even older periods. A contemptible pattern with two forms, two aspects, began to appear increasingly in our country especially after the

war. On the one hand, it suddenly offered the opportunity to improve one's prospects and one's position dramatically, without merit, without any real effort, even without any preconditions and without fulfillment of subjective demands (they were replaced with surrogates everywhere); on the other hand, the excessively high rating of political and administrative involvement—toward which our society in fact had been inclining already since the old Austrian era—was applied more and more. Because in the changed sociopolitical situation both aspects were supported and intensified by the sweeping liquidation of economic independence of individuals, families and groups, the membership in the ruling political party (the so-called political involvement, which included, on a descending scale, also membership in other organizations under the Party's control) became, if not the only one, then the decisive prerequisite for one's upward mobility and career. Viewpoints of professionalism began to be asserted in the 1960's, which on the one hand blazed the trail for the reformist movement within the Czech Communist Party [CPCZ], but on the other hand, it set off a surge of assignments and awards of academic degrees for political merits, in other words, honors that from the professional point of view were almost or completely unearned. That erupted with full force after the military and political intervention, toward the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's, when nearly all better educated and more competent individuals were being expelled not only from the party but from our economic, cultural, and public life in general. Its outcome was the notorious "conspiracy of the incompetents" which culminated in the disastrous development of our society during and after the war. It was precisely that development that instilled the above-mentioned prejudices and false priorities in most people's minds; its consequences were also evident during and after the "velvet revolution."

A critical look at our political development since the end of 1989 reveals that among our political activists were not only individuals, the so-called dissidents, as they have been and still are inaccurately called, but also persons until then politically neutral or at least, cautiously uninvolved, but competent in their various more or less technical fields, as well as persons who intended this way to conceal some overt or still covert compromising collaboration with the previous system, and finally, also various opportunists, the kind of people who follow every major political and social change and in most cases debase its quality and even legitimacy. The standard of the political thought and political experience of all the above-mentioned groups was low, mostly quite lamentable. That in itself opened completely unwarranted opportunities for incompetent and mediocre individuals. Moreover, something that had been felt already for some time came to the fore, namely, we found ourselves even less prepared for the new situation than in the late 1960's. The so-called sixty-eighters, i.e., the reform Communists expelled or excluded from the Party after the military occupation in August 1968, had and still have the greatest political experience. However, as it

turned out, they were not prepared for the new situation any better than the others, and their past experiences often more hurt than helped them. Most of them cannot cast off the burden of their past, and because of their lack of adaptability, they have become increasingly difficult partners. That inevitably generates a certain animosity and aversion against them, which both the individuals compromised over the past 20 years and the opportunists (especially because both have very similar mentality) and of course others, did not hesitate to exploit.

Every politically astute person had to expect as a matter of course that our society, having rid itself of an incompetent and despised regime, would initially react by leaning to the right. By the same token, of course, a paradox should be seen in that because the old system was extremely conservative and rightist, although it pretended to be leftist. Former communists could not subjectively overcome this paralogism, and therefore, they failed politically and squandered the benefits of their rehabilitation. Over the whole 20-year period they were witlessly focusing on a totally utopian prospect of resuming in some way 1968 and of linking with the Action Program, obviously unwilling to acknowledge the reality of the past two decades and the historical impossibility of such "returns" (in 1945 it was they who declared that a "return" was impossible, although then all it meant was to go back no more than six years!). The noncommunist left wing also failed completely, this time with ample assistance from the politically broken down and degraded social democratic emigration. Contrary to the logic of social reality, the left wing had gained important representation after the revolution and before the elections, but then committed serious political errors; that cast doubt on its credibility and capacity to act and fundamentally, albeit unintentionally, strengthened the position of the Communist Party which had not yet recovered its consciousness. The mistakes committed by the right wing were no less serious, and thus, in the elections it won far less than what it could have gained. And because no other known and established political party could come before the voters before the elections, many citizens cast their ballot for the Civic Forum [OF] more with hesitation and uncertainty than with conviction. At its inception the Civic Forum had declared itself a temporary organization, but it was not able to terminate its activities and undergo an internal transformation even after the municipal elections. Unfortunately, the rather peculiar "forum" coup that took place quite recently augurs nothing good.

In such a situation it is extremely difficult to weigh prospects for our entire political representation and to determine the position and future opportunities for our first citizen within its framework. In past years it was evident time and again that the so-called opposition (yet another inappropriate term) could not proceed without Vaclav Havel's mostly decisive cooperation (the only exception was when he was in detention but even then his imprisonment undoubtedly acted as an integrating force). That was even more obvious during the events in

November and in the following weeks. For that reason, it was only logical that Havel became the only serious presidential candidate, namely, as the candidate of the Civic Forum (despite Dubcek's considerable popularity which he enjoyed in the past and which he still enjoys, he could not be elected because he also represented reform Communists who had followed orders and remained silent for many years). However, today, after the transformation of the Civic Forum from a broad-spectrum centrist movement, Havel's position appears less secure and may even be shaky. In accordance with the old constitution, the president was not elected directly by the people but by the deputies. The change in the OF's political orientation has already led to major changes among the staff not only of the OF but also in the offices of the representative bodies (it is clear that this process is not yet over and that more changes may be forthcoming). At present it would be extremely inopportune for the OF's new chairman to distance himself from the president, but as concerns Havel, his situation is far more complicated. If he invokes the mandatory presidential impartiality, he will in fact sign a blank check, because no one knows at this point where the OF may turn from here and what exactly Vaclav Klaus's political intentions may be. As for our economic reform, there certainly is some legitimacy to the argument that it is wise to plan no more than about two moves ahead, since there is consensus of sorts about the principles and the basic framework of the reform. However, that cannot be said at all about political concepts. As everything today seems to indicate, Vaclav Klaus is a reductionist economist (just as Marxists used to be), and thus, it is quite possible that he has no political program to speak of. I am terrified by the thought that he might have some program after all, because then he would have had and still may have some reason to keep it so scrupulously under cover. But I am just as much terrified by the thought that the OF's future political profile will now be determined by new people handpicked by Klaus. It seems that so far he has been even less successful than our president in choosing his advisers and coworkers. The future may bring us even more unpleasant surprises. However, our considerations are facing above all the question whether all the president is prepared to do is to attend to all future changes and to submit to the parliament some solitary proposal once in a while.

The first years of our republic show us how limited and restrained Masaryk's opportunities to influence domestic policies of the new state were. As for myself, I have never concluded that Masaryk should have been given more presidential powers, but that the exact opposite is true. My impression always was that Masaryk could have exerted far more influence on our political and all public life had he not been so restricted by the duties and limitations of his high office. Perhaps the greatest mistake was to actually condemn a man of such unique qualities to play a role for which a far more mediocre personality would be entirely adequate. His great prestige and reputation abroad were welcome assets also for governments with whose programs

Masaryk could not agree; later he was blamed for various issues on which in reality he could have little or no influence. It is absurd that a widespread common concept considers the idea of presidency as the ultimate goal that one can attain in life. I think that we should expose this misconception patiently and thoroughly, disprove it gradually and finally, dispense with it.

In case of Thomas G. Masaryk I am ready to concede that his presidential office played a significant role during the initial period because the new society was only beginning to set up its political system. And secondly, Masaryk was already in his seventies and there was nothing much to be expected from his professorial career and from his scientific and philosophical endeavors (let us admit that, although it hardly fits in Masaryk's case and although we know of many instances when mental and creative capacities remained fresh even in very advanced years). However, today we are dealing with a completely different problem, which we should fully recognize. If we want a president for representation and diplomatic formalities, then Vaclav Havel is wasted; in fact, he is absolutely wasted. Our country's cultural psyche must have been terribly traumatized if hardly a soul realizes what a luxury, nay, extravagance it is for us to be willing to trade an outstanding playwright, one of our greatest ever and the most famous we have in the world, for an admired president. If we insist on keeping him on as president, then we must grant him authority and power so that he may exert far more influence on our country's politics and all public life in general than ever before. Although he is not yet a professional politician, at the given moment we have no one better in that respect. I am afraid that soon our lands will very badly need a strong president.

However, up to this point I outlined the situation from the viewpoint of our society. But how does it look from Vaclav Havel's own perspective? Naturally, I cannot speak for him, but if I were in his place, I would have an obtrusive and uncontrollable feeling that I am being sacrificed. Whether he does or does not feel the same, I warrant that it is real sacrifice. Many people may not want to admit that; it is possible that Vaclav Havel himself does not see it as that at all. If that is the case, it confirms that we all terribly overestimate the significance of professional politics in the life of our society as well as of individual citizens and in our own lives. I always believed that politics should play approximately the same role in the life of all of us as traffic police at intersections and highways: politics should keep order and organize all public movement, but it must not interfere with the destination of any of the drivers. By that I do not mean that everybody may drive wherever he pleases. As in the life of an individual, so in the life of whole societies some acts and some actions are of greater and some of lesser significance, and some are obviously senseless and harmful. Nevertheless, that is a matter with which not the politicians and political functionaries but our whole society and each of its members must deal. Especially now this unusually urgent task calls for the upgrading of the cultural, ideological, moral, and spiritual standard of our society. However, it is not a task only or primarily for politicians,

but a task for all and for each one of us. We may regard it also as a political task, but then we must differentiate between technical politics and the politics which Masaryk described as "apolitical politics." Finally, we must take Masaryk seriously. At the end of the 19th century he already pointed out that "the state and political life do not have such importance for the nation as we so often attribute to them," and that "the state and political life comprise only a lesser part of our spiritual life" (*Ceska otazka* [*The Czech Problem*]).

Ineffective or deficient politics can be dangerous for society, but even superior and the best functioning technical politics cannot replace our "identity" and our "spiritual independence" which, as Masaryk said, "even political independence alone cannot guarantee us." I am absolutely certain that creators of culture are far more important than politicians for this deeper, decisive dimension of our national and social existence; thus, quite specifically: Playwrights are more important than presidents....

President Havel Addresses Religious Festival

LD2104123591 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1100 GMT 21 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Here is Antonin Pecenka, who has a topical report for us from Levy Hradec and Vltavou. Please excuse the poor audio quality of this telephone despatch.

[Pecenka] A wonderful national cultural tradition—the St. Adalbet Festival held in Levy Hradec—has been revived. Thousands of people attended it today. In conclusion, after the holy mass officiated by Prague Bishop Jan Lebeda, CSFR President Vaclav Havel delivered an address. He greeted all pilgrims and voiced his pleasure at the fact that so many of them have gathered here, in the place which reminds us of our statehood. [passage omitted]

'At the present time, when we talk about our entry into Europe, we must, in fact, realize that we have been in Europe for more than a thousand years,' Vaclav Havel said. 'We belong there and the history of Levy Hradec is testimony to it. We must lead a worthy life in Europe.'

The gathering was also addressed by Czech Premier Petr Pithart. Dagmar Buresova and other prominent guests were present. The festival was therefore successful.

POLAND

KONFRONTACJE Political Tidbits: March

91EP0377A Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish
No 3 (38), Mar 91 pp 6-7

[From the "Leaks" column]

[Excerpts]

From the Belweder

[passage omitted]

President Walesa wants the prominent union activists Kaczynski, Borusewicz, and Lis to remain in Solidarity.

The head of the Office of the President, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has suggested that they be added to the group of advisors. Walesa was supposed to say that he cannot allow a lack of control of the union. As regards Bogdan Lis, a proposal has been made that he become an ambassador.

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Prof. Janusz Ziolkowski, currently minister of state of the Republic of Poland in the Belweder, is to become the minister of foreign affairs after the parliamentary elections. Initial discussions have been held, and at present everything depends on the candidate's agreement. [passage omitted]

From the Congress of the Center Accord

During the congress lists of prominent members of the former communist regime who have formed partnerships or placed themselves in comfortable government posts were circulated. Other than their names, their connections with activists of the Citizens Movement—Democratic Action (ROAD) and the Democratic Union (UD) were also given.

From the Ministry of Industry

The opening of an office of Hewlett-Packard makes it possible to modernize the Polish arms industry. The large concern sees more than just investment or financial benefits in Poland. In exchange for the cooperation of Polish mathematicians and computer scientists, the Americans agreed to consider transforming the large arms industry factories into assembly plants for modern computer equipment also for civilian use. During President Walesa's visit to the United States, the final details concerning technological cooperation between American industry and Poland are to be settled. An initial hurdle, the Americans have said, is the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Poland. The Italians, who have also offered to reform the Polish auto industry, are also trying to compete with an interesting offer to restructure the Polish arms industry.

From the Democratic Union [UD]

The national minority groups could be an ally in the parliamentary elections. During a round of preelection meetings in Dolny Slask, Tadeusz Mazowiecki devoted a great deal of attention to the German minority. He also intends to visit the eastern lands of the Republic to support the efforts of Greek Catholics to use one of the churches in Przemyśl. He is also counting heavily on the votes of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian minorities.

A division of the roles in the parliamentary campaign has been made, and a provisional list of parliamentary candidates has been drawn up. Tadeusz Mazowiecki intends to be a candidate in Dolny Slask.

Stanislaw Tyminski, who is following T. Mazowiecki's preelection footsteps, is drawing the same size crowds but greater enthusiasm.

From the Christian National Union [ZChN]

In accord with the policy of their prenatal politics, during the Sejm campaign on the antiabortion law, the activists and party officials are to march on the pharmacies and sex shops to liquidate contraceptives and publications that offend public morality. The second stage of the action against the wave of pornography will be a campaign to send letters and petitions to the parliament, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the president. By April, the activists are to have investigated all the places selling pornography and established a detailed list which then will be sent to Prof. Wieslaw Chrzanowski, the prosecutor general [as published]. A group of deputies from the Christian National Union and some Christian democrats in the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] will introduce an appropriate legislative initiative before this Sejm is dissolved.

From the Confederation for an Independent Poland

In spite of the purchase of an attractive press title, the party will not be able to publish. Many of the printers in Poland are refusing to cooperate with the Confederation for an Independent Poland because it is financially insolvent. The practice with the Confederation's paper OPINIA has been to shift the title to a printer with whom the Confederation for an Independent Poland had no debts without settling the finances with the previous one. Finally, no printer was willing to produce the Confederation's paper OPINIA. The party which is on the edge of bankruptcy is thinking about entering into a partnership with foreign publishing capital in conjunction with the purchase of RAZEM.

From the Ministry of Finance

Stanislaw Tyminski has proposed to pay Poland's debt to Brazil with shipments of the military equipment not shipped to Iraq. The equipment would be priced attractively. The sales would not liquidate the huge debt, but they would be a sign of friendship and of Poland's good intentions. Tyminski would handle the settlement of the entire deal.

From the Main Board of PAX

L. Piasecki, the leader of the radical nationalist group, has decided to initiate legal proceedings against the current chairman, M. Wrzeszcz, concerning the division of PAX's assets. However, the main barrier remains the existence of the association the majority of whose members are Christian-democratic activists. Thus, Ladyslaw Piasecki has decided to organize a congress of the organizations, parties, and national communities to combine into a single party in the near future.

From the Ministry of Justice

Minister Wieslaw Chrzanowski thinks that as a party leader he can make real changes in the operations of the ministry. He has asked for a large funding increase for the courts and prosecutors, and the fact that he is the leader of the ZChN [Christian National Union] mobilizes him even more to follow the letter of the law. In reply to comments that he is violating the apolitical nature of the ministry in some way, he added that former Minister Bentkowski represented the United Peasant Party [ZSL] (later the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]) and somehow that did not bother anyone. He also separated himself from personnel proposals made by the Center Accord and the ZChN because he does not support a party nomenklatura.

Peasant Parties Called To Coordinate Platforms

91EP0382C Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
11 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Zdzislaw Zaryczny: "Three Questions for Peasant Leaders"]

[Text] It is no exaggeration to claim that the peasant parties may win the coming elections. But it would be an exaggeration to claim that they are prepared for this eventuality. At any rate, the current situation of the peasant movement merits watching. For it is this movement that may resolve the question of who will rule Poland in the coming years.

I would consider it a great surprise if the peasant leaders—Roman Bartoszcze, Gabriel Janowski, and Jozef Slisz—were to appeal for forming joint peasant electoral committees and combined slates of candidates. Those aware of the depth of the divisions among that trio will at once refute any such possibility. But politics is the art of the impossible, the more so considering that today, more than ever, the interests and aims of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party], the PSL "S" [Polish Peasant Party "Solidarity"], and Rural Solidarity seem identical. It is simply that Polish farming and the countryside have similar problems.

Among the grassroots this truth is self-evident and this or that particular green hue of one peasant party membership card or another is of no major importance. Similarly, the postulate of "electing the best" sounds rhetorical to the countryside; they know their own people. A candidate for a peasant deputy must be perfectly aware that he will be vetted very thoroughly, whether this concerns his antecedents—as far as his great-grandfathers are concerned even—or the last grain of wheat in his silo. But once he passes this test, he can be certain of the support of farmers, regardless of whether he belongs to the PSL led by Bartoszcze, the PSL "S" led by Slisz, or the trade union [Rural Solidarity] led by Janowski. That is because to the grassroots it is no problem to answer the question of what kind of unity. It is the leaders that have this problem.

What Kind of Unity?

However, too many centrifugal forces operate at the top. Probably the most important of these forces is the ambitions of peasant leaders, which are skillfully encouraged by their courts and well-intentioned advisers. Each of these leaders would like to be, or already feels himself to be, another Witos or Mikolajczyk. They are dreaming of Belweders [Presidential palaces], and red-carpet treatment on Wiejska Street [site of the parliament] and Ujazdowskie Avenue [site of the Council of Ministers]. Their rivalry grew in the last two years, during which the peasant movement often became an arena of contests by outsiders.

Above all, the constantly powerful role played by the Roman Catholic Church has to be considered. Today peasant leaders will, in practice, take no strategic decision without consulting their pastors, e.g., Archbishop Dabrowski or Bishops Andrzejewski and Tokarczuk. This is in no way surprising. The church was present 10 years ago at the conclusion of the Ustrzycko-Rzeszow agreements which laid the foundation of Rural Solidarity. And it was precisely at Prelate Bijak's parish house in Wilanow that the organizers of the resurrected PSL held their founding meeting.

To anyone who recalls the ancient leftist traditions of the peasant movement, e.g. the "Wiciarze" ["Young Farmers"], this situation may seem somewhat surprising. But this is the reality: politicking in the countryside nowadays is accompanied by the church bells, rosaries, and incense burners, and anybody who does not understand this should better desist from trying to ally himself with the peasant activists.

And yet, a different constellation also is conceivable: the peasant parties in a coalition with liberal and democratic groupings. That would be a "coalition of economic common sense," as a PSL deputy defined it. Such a coalition would appeal less to nationalist and class—peasant—sentiments and more to examples of efficient management. In my opinion, time is working on behalf of precisely such a coalition.

That is because the fashion for "political warfare" is passing. Embroidered banners now serve merely to celebrate the masses in churches, and in the countryside a new generation of activists, pragmatists who can point to their astuteness and accumulated wealth as proofs of their leadership abilities, is coming to the fore. They are not and will not be the sole category of peasant leaders, because divisions in the countryside are quite extensive, with the programs of action attractive to rich breeders and planters being quite different from the programs attractive to state farm employees who have been striking in recent weeks. Today, however, under the liberal government of Prime Minister Bielecki, which is promoting the slogans of free enterprise and self-enrichment, it is precisely this group that is most dynamic.

The best solution in the long run would be a strong peasant party cooperating with strong trade unions, representing the interests of its membership and of the countryside as a whole—and not just the countryside—on the political arena. This precisely is the idea attracting influential circles of peasant activists in eastern and southern Poland, who do not approve of partisan warfare in the countryside. Bartoszcze, Janowski, and Slisz—here I am not mentioning the Bak group and several others, because, in view of their internal schisms and weaknesses, they are incapable of playing any significant role—should listen very attentively to these grass-roots voices if they do not want to be left behind like living monuments which are paid homage but rapidly passed by.

Since the attractiveness of nationalist-religious slogans has clearly declined, and the dispute about which grouping is more “Mikolajczyk-like” is of limited interest today, it is time again to ask...

...What Program?

Today this is the most fundamental question, because there exist no major differences in the programs of the various peasant parties. They all desire to satisfy the food needs of the country and farms; break up rural monopolies and gmina [township administration] cliques; regionize farm policies; and retain government subsidies for certain foodstuffs, particularly milk. They all, too, reject the idea of class warfare and declare their political openness and desire to cooperate with all the forces building a new order in this country. Naturally, they all claim to be attached to the social teachings of the church. The details, forms, and methods of action may differ, but on fundamental issues all the peasant groupings speak in one voice.

Why is it then that that voice becomes so cacophonous by the time it reaches the Sejm rooms or party headquarters? Let us call a spade a spade. The peasant movement still lacks an elite of activists, functionaries, and advisers that would assure it of stability and the power to resist fortuitous shocks and quakes. As a consequence, any personal conflict, even if it is not primary, immediately threatens party unity. And what happens if it is the leaders themselves that begin to wrangle, as had happened at last January's plenary meeting of the PSL Supreme Council?

A strong and efficient political elite could soften the manners and the tone of burly activists. But the peasant movement lacks such an elite and the needed instruments for exercising its influence. And unless it adopts an active policy toward the cities, toward the intelligentsia, it will continue to lack such an elite and such instruments.

It is the press that is particularly important. Neither the PSL nor the PSL “S” has its own newspaper. Rural Solidarity does publish a weekly, to be sure, but it still cannot soar above its present pedestrian level. The need is ripe for combining the scanty forces of the peasant

parties in order to publish a single genuine newspaper. But how can it happen when every leader wants to publish a newspaper of his own party alone? It is the countryside and the peasant movement that are the losers thereby, since they lack a forum for presenting their rationales, problems, and arguments. During an electoral campaign this is a gap that simply cannot be filled.

The question of a joint program is thus to be seen as referring not only to some facade, e.g., a joint position on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, which was treated at length in an address delivered to the PSL “S” by Chairman Bartoszcze as a guest speaker. What is more important, and what does not at all point to some supposed backwardness of the Polish countryside, is specific proposals for resolving its problems. One such proposal is at present being offered by, e.g., Gabriel Janowski who advocates the idea of open electoral committees. This is linked to the third question, namely...

...What Coalition?

In view of their strength and likely role as the arbiter of the future political scene of Poland, peasant groupings are a highly attractive partner for negotiations and an eventual alliance. Today there is no political grouping that can afford to ignore the positions taken by the PSL or Rural Solidarity.

The question remains, who will the peasant leaders trust? With whom will they ally themselves at election time? Jozef Slisz claims that he will conclude an alliance only with those parties which derive from the Solidarity “tree trunk.” But Center Accord is growing increasingly distant from ROAD [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action] or from Labor Solidarity. Still, in view of Jozef Slisz's liking for the president of Center Accord, an alliance with that party is more likely, even though Artur Balazs of the Democratic Union [UD] is trying hard to bring the PSL “S” closer to Mazowiecki's party [UD].

Conflicting information is arriving from the camp of Roman Bartoszcze. The confusion also stems from the fact that the leadership group of that party is torn among different options. Chairman Bartoszcze himself engages in the most important negotiations and sends letters, but it is difficult to judge as yet the results of that diplomacy. All that is known is that representatives of the church are trying to prompt the PSL to cooperate with the Labor Party and the Christian-National Union. Judging from the denials issued by the Christian-National Union, not everyone is interested in that cooperation.

The greatest mystery is what will Rural Solidarity do? Who will it support? With whom will it form a coalition? Gabriel Janowski is appealing for the political unity of the countryside and, at the same, time declaring readiness for dialogue with various political orientations. It is too early to predict the ultimate result of all this.

It is interesting that the possibility of a fusion of peasant groupings is hardly mentioned. But still such an option cannot be precluded, menacing as it is to many petty, quarrelsome, and raucous "banana" parties. Of a certainty a variety of attempts will be made to frustrate this idea. However, peasants and their leaders are unpredictable—one day they quarrel, and another they make up. Let me remind skeptics of the atmosphere at the Unity Congress of 5 May 1990. This may happen again.

It is therefore worthwhile to consider the alternative of a Poland ruled by a strong peasant bloc. This is, as I understand the leader of Rural Solidarity, Senator Janowski, his positive scenario. What about the negative scenario? That would be represented by a victory of the "Tyminskiytes" and "Szelites," according to the leader of Rural Solidarity. In other words, that would mean a continuing political division of the countryside and sudden eruption of conflicts which would involve Rural Solidarity.

But I hope that other scenarios also are likely. The coming elections will be unusual, and the electoral coalitions in the countryside also may be unusual.

Call for More Autonomy in Local Governments

91EP0343A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
28 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Lech Mazewski: "Regions and Autonomy"]

[Text] At present, we have a single level of local self-government at the level of the gmina. Its structure corresponds more or less to the European standard. That does not mean that the current situation is considered unalterable.

Further levels of the decentralization of Poland were proposed by Prime Minister Jan K. Bielecki in his speeches on 14 and 16 February 1991. The proposal calls for the gradual construction of a second level of local self-government and the initiation of regionalization in Poland.

A Second Level of Local Self-Government

Today one can say that we have three and a half levels of government administration (the government, the voivode, the region, and assigned tasks) and only a half level of local self-government (the local self-government's own tasks). This tendency must be reversed by the self-governing bodies taking over tasks from the state administration and by liquidating the regions as the third level of government administration.

The attempt to distribute authority between the local self-governments and the government administrative bodies made in the law on jurisdiction encountered general dissatisfaction. The provisions for assigning issues to be conducted in the name of these bodies that are to be included in the law on local government

administrative bodies are to serve as a legal instrument providing a temporary correction of the division of tasks and jurisdiction.

On 14 February, Jan K. Bielecki again asked the voivodes to take actions transferring the maximum number of tasks and jurisdictions provided for in the legal regulations for the government administration (except for the "administrative police") to the gmina bodies. Moreover, he announced that by the end of February proposed changes to the jurisdictional law would be prepared.

Representatives of the National Local Self-Government Sejmik are participating in the work on this proposal. The proposal expands the gmina's own tasks and narrows the range of action of the regional government administrative bodies. The core of the problem, however, consists of changes in the substantive law in a way that limits the range of administrative regulation from the central level. And that, unfortunately, is a more lengthy process.

In conjunction with the new division of tasks between the government administration and the local self-government, it will be possible to liquidate the regions. In their place, a second level of self-government is to be formed. Once this level is in place, it will be possible to expand the range of local issues. They would include not only tasks of a strictly local nature performed until now by the gminas, but also issues above the gmina level, excluding, however, the "administrative police," which would remain under the voivodes.

The formation of the second level of local self-government will be gradual. It should proceed from below—by the gminas forming intermunicipal unions. As a result, the date by which the second level will be formed depends in large measure on the activities of the gminas themselves.

The Regionalization of Poland

But the local self-government is only one of the levels of the decentralization of the state. In the majority of Western states, there is an intermediate level between the gmina and the national state—the region understood in one way or another. How should the process of regionalizing Poland begin?

Above all a new territorial division of the country, adapted to the system of government, is needed. Rapid changes in this area can have a redeeming influence on the rate of reform and on the final shape of the constitutional system. Thus, the new territorial division can play the role of a catalyst for the Polish reforms.

The prime minister announced that in the near future a proposal for a new division into 10 to 12 units of a size comparable to the Western regions will be presented. The task of the Regional Political Units—in the voivodship centers which will be the capitals of the new regions in the future—is to attempt to create a genuine regional

policy and not just conduct activities on a voivodship level. Moreover, they would observe changes coming from below in the area of territorial division. The comparison of the territorial range of the intermunicipal unions formed with the government proposals would be of particular significance here. Thanks to it, the government would obtain invaluable information on the final form of the new territorial division of Poland.

In addition to the representatives of the government and scholars, representatives of the local self-governments, of the regional societies, of the secretariat of state for local self-government affairs, and of both chambers of parliament will participate in the work on the plans for the new territorial division of Poland.

The proposal for the new territorial division is only the beginning of the discussion on the shape of the regionalization of Poland. The next great problem is: what is the Polish region to be in the organizational phase? Is the region to be a self-government as in France, or should we strive for autonomous regions as in Spain, for example?

We should choose then between the region as a third level of local self-government and an attempt to form a regional state based on the general principle of territorial autonomy. It may happen that the self-governing region will be a stage in the creation of a regional state (autonomous region). As yet we do not have to decide, but we should already be considering it.

The Decentralized State

The new policy proposed by Jan K. Bielecki is an attempt to fundamentally decentralize the state. In formulating it, he referred to liberal convictions that decentralization does not weaken but strengthens state authorities. The local units have been offered participation not only in the process of governing the state, but also in bearing real responsibility for the state. Our ideal should be strong authorities that are, nevertheless, clearly limited and balanced. That can be achieved, in turn, by strengthening local self-government and regionalizing Poland.

Ethnic, National Minority Panorama Presented

91EP0382A *Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish*
12 Mar 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "A Panorama of Nationalities"]

[Text]

Belorussians

They number about 200,000. They inhabit Bialystok and Biala Podlaska Voivodships. Their oldest organization in postwar Poland is the Belorussian Sociocultural Society (BTSK), established in 1956. It has a membership of about 1,000.

Other organizations of Belorussians in Poland are: the Belorussian Association of University Students, active

since 1968, and the Belorussian Democratic Union (BZD), the first Belorussian political party, established in 1990. The leader of the BZD is the well-known Belorussian writer Sokrat Janowicz, who lives in Bialystok. The party's goal is to promote the economic growth of the eastern part of the Bialystok Voivodship and to halt the assimilation of Belorussians in Poland.

The Belorussian language is taught at 45 schools to 3,265 children. In addition, it is the language of instruction at two high schools (in Hajnowka and Biala Podlaska). The only department of Belorussian philology outside Belorussia itself exists in Poland at the University of Warsaw, and it is chaired by Aleksander Barszczewski. The construction of the Museum of Relics of Belorussian Culture is continuing in Hajnowka.

Gypsies

In our country they do not have the status of a national minority, being rather defined as an ethnic group. Their community numbers some 10,000 to 15,000, a figure which is steadily shrinking owing to emigration (chiefly to Germany).

The Gypsies are associated in four communities: Tarnow, Olsztyn, Zyrardow, and Andrychow.

At the regional museum in Tarnow there is a permanent Gypsy exhibition. That city also contains the House of Culture of the Romanies in Poland. Each year a review of Gypsy ensembles takes place in Gorzow Wielkopolski.

As of last August a Romany periodical, ROM PO DROM, has begun to be published. Its editorial address is in Bialystok.

Czechs and Slovaks

They form the joint Sociocultural Society of Czechs and Slovaks, established in 1957. The society has a membership of 3,200 out of the roughly 25,000 Czechs and Slovaks living in Poland. The Slovaks are concentrated in the areas of Spisz and Orawa (Nowy Sacz Voivodship), while the Czechs live in the environs of Zelow. The periodical ZIVOT, which is published in Warsaw in the Slovak, Czech, and Polish languages, has a circulation of 1,000.

Czech and Slovak cultural activities are under way at six regional song and dance ensembles.

The Slovak language is taught at the elementary level at 23 locales. In addition, there is an academic high school with Slovak as the language of instruction in Jablonka.

Greeks

At present there are some 2,000 persons of Greek nationality in Poland; they form the Society of Greeks in Poland. The statutory activities of that society are chiefly focused on maintaining its members' ties to the homeland, meeting Greek cultural needs, and self-help.

Lithuanians

The Lithuanians are concentrated in Punszk Township and the environs of Sejny (Suwalki Voivodship). Sizable concentrations of Lithuanians also live in Warsaw, Wrocław, and Slupsk.

The Lithuanian Sociocultural Society (LTSK) with its membership of 1,700 (out of the 30,000 Lithuanians living in this country) in 46 local clubs maintains 11 amateur arts companies (five theatrical and six musical-vocal).

The LTSK has recently started to publish a quarterly and, as of the beginning of this year, the monthly, *AUSRA* with a circulation of 400 copies.

Lithuanian is the language of instruction at one elementary school and one secondary school. In addition, 22 stations for teaching in Lithuanian are operating.

Early in 1990 another Lithuanian society, the St. Casimir Society, was formed.

Germans

There now exist several regions in which German societies are active: Opole, Wodzislaw Slaski, Gdansk, Walbrzych, Wrocław, and Torun. The most active group is that of Henryk Krol and Jan Krol of Gogolin, which had organized a drive for collecting signatures for the so-called list of friends. The list was signed by about 250,000 people. The Krol group stresses primarily the need to preserve and nurture "Silesianness" and ties to German culture and state. Also, recently the German Worker Community "Reconciliation and Future," headed by Dietmar Brehmer, has been active in Katowice, in addition to other, smaller Silesian regional organizations.

Jews

The Jewish community in Poland numbers about 15,000. In 1956 the Sociocultural Society of Jews was formed (from a merger of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland with the Jewish Cultural Society), with a membership of about 2,000; it operates 15 local branches throughout Poland.

The society also publishes the weekly *FOLKS-SZTYME* in the Polish and Yiddish languages (circulation about 1,030).

The Jewish community is the only one among the national minorities in Poland to have a state-sponsored cultural institution of its own, the Jewish Theater.

An institution associating some 4,000 Jews in Poland is the Religious Association of the Mosaic Persuasion, headed by Rabbi Pinchas Menachem Joskowicz. The association publishes a Jewish calendar.

Others—Not Many

Russians, Armenians, Tartars, and Karaites.

Rightist Disorder at German Border Stirrs Fears

91GE0237Z Munich *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*
in German 10 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Knut Pries, Frankfurt/Oder: "Take Arms Against the Return of the Specters: Fears at the Polish Border That Radical Right Disorder Could Signify Worse Things To Come"]

[Text] Who came, with or without visas, on the first day of open borders for the Poles? "Approximately 91,164 entries" were reported by 0400 on Tuesday morning at the 19 border crossing points, the border patrol said on the day after the "assault" that wasn't. And where were the merchants who picked Aldi's shelves clean of lemon tea, so that there would be none left for the Germans? Where were the smugglers in their Fiat Polskis, with trailers full of cigarettes, salami, inexpensive shirts, determined to open up a "Polish market" right around the corner? Where were the columns of buses, and the trains from Warsaw, jam-packed with hordes of haggling tourists who would deluge the streets of Berlin to conduct their questionable dealings, if need be, in the entryway to the nearest house?

"Where reason has drifted off to slumber, the specters come," says the teacher Lucina Leyko from Slubice, the small town adjacent to Frankfurt on the Oder, on the other side of the border that now really is open between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. Ms. Leyko teaches at the Lyzeum in Slubice, and she experienced the historic moment on midnight Monday at the "Peace Bridge." The great moment had to be postponed for just under an hour, due to the fact that peace had not made such progress after all, because on the other side of the border a troop of right-wing radical youths with clouded sense had sung reason a lullaby.

Not a Word About Fear

The fact that "Germany for the Germans" was the watchword, that foreigners in general, and Poles in particular, never lost anything there, that "Polack blood" would flow, if it had to—Ms. Leyko and her compatriots who were waiting on the bridge could hear it all. In point of fact, on Tuesday, the Lyzeum was supposed to be visited by pupils from the expanded secondary modern school of Frankfurt. The teacher said she postponed the visit, because now she would have to explain to her pupils what had happened, that there were, among the Germans, many "people who were quite wonderful", but there were also many with a "deep-seated fear that finds its expression in chauvinism and nationalism."

Of course, there is not a word about fear when later, three hours after the first set-to, a scattered group of the young right-wing radicals was fortifying itself for the next round on canned beer. Among the perpetrators, research into motives yields much simpler answers. They said they acted "because they are foreigners, and because it's fun." Previously, among the approximately 150

half-grown youths in the mob by the bridge, it was possible to hear a wide variety of sentiments. They show that the teacher from the neighboring town is not so far off the mark with her analysis: "It's all the frustration that's coming out here," someone bubbles excitedly into a reporter's microphone, interrupted again and again by his buddies, who all want to say the same thing. "Beating people is not exactly a nice way to behave, but nothing else works." Before they open up the border and do something for the Poles, the Germans come first—all the unemployed and the people like him, a painter in retraining. What does he have, anyway? Five hundred marks a month, and here come all those outstretched hands from Poland, "with fists full of hundred-mark notes. If they drive prices up in Frankfurt, there will be a mini 'Crystal Night.'" He said that as long as the Poles can come in unhindered, there would be trouble at the bridge. He said the reporter could convince himself of that fact in just under two weeks. That is when someone will have a birthday. He is dead, to be sure, but in this area, he enjoys more sympathy than the men in Bonn. Then, the young man adds that even when it comes to matters of right-wing radicalism, as an "easterner," it is necessary to know where one stands—"then the Skinheads come from over there, and they're tougher than we are by half." Specters?

The West German neo-Nazi Michael Kuehnen was in Frankfurt as such a specter, sent by the party. His "German alternative" will take advantage of 8 April to demonstrate their increased strength in eastern Germany, the local merchants' paper, the *Oder Anzeiger*, reported in a conspicuously prepared early report, relying on "well-informed sources." Kuehnen and the Fascist mobs from all over Germany were still nothing more than a rumor. Among the 41 arrested, only one was from the old Federal Republic, Wuppertal.

Thus, the city fathers would not like to take the words of the right-wing fanatics as dramatically as they were bellowed out on Tuesday. The Deputy Lord Mayor, Detlef Ewert, said, after the first assessment on the following day that these were "not just young people, but young young people." The rowdies' claim that 80 percent of the population secretly think as they do, was wildly exaggerated. He said the citizens' feelings were "somewhat contradictory", and that was the case because all the unpleasant associations of the years 1972 through 1980 were still fresh in people's memories. Back then, before the fear of ideas associated with Solidarity put an end to it, the German Democratic Republic permitted unrestricted entry from its Socialist neighbors, and at the time, traffic degenerated to chaos and there were bottle-necks in Frankfurt as far as supplies were concerned.

Now, however, Ewers raised the concern that conditions had changed. It was true that the situation on the roads was largely unchanged, because expansion of the two border crossing points, namely the bridge into town and the autobahn bridge have to be postponed. He claimed that tie-ups were unavoidable, especially on weekends. But now, in the shops at least, everyone is forearmed. He

said the market economy was taking care of the problem of resupply, no one in Frankfurt has to fear the prospect of confronting plundered shelves.

Despite this relativization, however, even Ewert looks to the future not entirely without trepidation. After violent confrontations between the autonomists and the young fascists in the Frankfurt squatter scene, he himself has taken great pains to "maintain a dialogue" with radicals of both stripes. He said it should be taken as a success that it has been possible to keep the leftists from making a showing of their own at the border. In the case of the neo-Nazis, on the other hand "the point at which they said: 'That's it, we'll strike out,' was reached much more quickly." So, Ewert is becoming resigned to the notion that there will be further unrest. "Violence directed toward foreigners should be expected, along with the demolition of cars and attacks on citizens."

Evidently, a good many Poles considered that this sort of thing would happen on the first day, and they stayed home, or, they turned back at the Frankfurt bridge, when word was spread of the events on the other side. Even the passenger in the first car that finally passed through the barricade needed a sip from a proffered hip flask before he was able to pull himself together to a sufficient degree to say bravely "no problem, we'll get through!" and found the courage to continue, shielded from the howling mob by policemen. He also said "We're not a band of robbers or gypsies."

"Completely Normal"

Anyone who wanted to could later convince himself of that fact in Berlin. There, people were prepared for what the more reserved refer to under the circumstances as "certain manifestations." The new senator for internal affairs, Dieter Heckelmann, found a more direct way of expressing it. He said that "the nuisance posed by the prospect of as many as 100,000 Polish visitors on a weekend, with their illegal dealings, their criminality, their endless filth, was more than one could be reasonably expected to tolerate in certain quarters of the city." No one wanted to leave it to the Polish foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, to nip that sort of thing in the bud, to warn his compatriots to engage in "civilized" behavior abroad. The official greetings of welcome, the protestations of openness to the world and the liberality of the capital city, the talk of "normality" already achieved, or soon to be achieved, were supplemented in all quarters by indications of the list of options and regulatory measures that could be resorted to if need be; thought was given to "the obligation to rescind" and the "suspension clause" in the agreement between Poland and the signatories of the Schengen Accord, to the projected "central file" on the violators among the visitors, the "deportation procedures," to beefed up monitoring by the police: on that occasion, a welcoming hand was extended that definitely knew how to strike out.

The message arrived. Among the manageable little troops of Polish tourists who were successful in their shopping, not entirely without difficulty due to the hubbub from the press, the first reports were always: "No problems!" It should be noted that in some cases, the psychological preparation left uncomfortable feelings on the part of the hosts: additional public toilets and extra policemen by way of preparation were somewhat shoddy, criticized Barbara Jahn, Berlin's appointed expert on foreigners. The measures she suggested—directional signs in Polish, new discount stores at the edge of town, more parking spaces—all these have been nothing more than ideas thus far. So, the only thing that was done was a guidebook that was hastily translated into Polish, which was distributed at the Zoo Station and in front of an Aldi store on Kantstrasse. There was no more sign of additional public toilets than there was of a resuscitation of the infamous illegal market at the Philharmonic. No, everything was completely normal, said two contact area policemen on patrol in Charlottenburg, quite a different story from the situation a year earlier, when lines were forming in front of the lower priced shops as early as 0300. But at that time, they said the Poles were able to do their real buying only in Berlin. "That was a necessary measure." The fact that there were problems for the residents is clear. Then, too, some of the visitors were not exactly what one would have wanted, but on the whole, they were well-behaved people.

In their search for problems created by the Poles, the journalists did encounter two events from Tuesday. A Volkswagen bus double-parked in front of Aldi, and

behind the Charlottenburg commuter train station, someone urinated in the bushes. In both cases, they were journalists on the hunt for Poles.

State Protection Office Seizes Arms

*LD1904192891 Warsaw PAP in English 1650 GMT
19 Apr 91*

[Text] Katowice, April 19—The State Protection Office (UOP) has recently seized an illegal arsenal kept by former security service agent in Bytom and the case is now investigated by regional prosecutor in Katowice. Leader of the Silesian branch of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) Adam Slomka said at a press conference here last Thursday: "We identified the arsenal and we informed the UOP. We kept this fact in secret for as long as the UOP wished but there is reasonable possibility that someone may try to hush up the matter." According to Slomka some of the former security service and militia reserve members are preparing for terrorist actions. Slomka also said the KPN knew about other such arsenals and a clandestine structure comprising 30-40 persons from Zabrze, Zawiercie, Myslowice, and Chorzow who are "centrally" commanded from at least the voivodship level. "This information came from our intelligence run by reliable and tested people," Slomka said. In connection with the threat of terrorism which, according to the KPN is growing, the Confederation appealed to all employees and collaborators of the former security service and militia reserve for providing information that might be helpful in "neutralizing the threat of terrorism posed by former members of the repression apparatus."

BULGARIA

Major General Petrov on Relations With NATO

AU1804181891 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI
in Bulgarian 12-13 Apr p 2

[Interview with Major General Kamen Petrov, "secretary of the National Security Council," by VECHERNI NOVINI reporter Mariyana Boyadzhieva; place and date not given: "Multiple Guarantees of Security"]

[Text] [Boyadzhieva] In our previous interview, more than six months ago, we touched upon the future of the Warsaw Pact and its place in the general system of European security. The pact's disintegration already is a fact. Is Bulgaria defenseless, and what alternatives does a small state have?

[Petrov] There is no more important task than guaranteeing the country's national security in a reliable manner. Therefore, recently one often hears the question: Is Bulgaria defenseless after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact? A positive answer would mean that our attitude toward this issue is, to put it mildly, superficial and irresponsible. Such an answer would lead us toward fateful and incorrect conclusions, which are not supported by serious arguments.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact placed Bulgaria in a completely new foreign policy and military-strategic situation. We lost important external guarantees of our security. However, other guarantees continue to exist. The question is whether they are sufficient. The clear answer is—no.

Under the circumstances, it is obvious that the necessity exists of seeking new ways and additional means of obtaining the reliable guarantees our country needs.

Generally speaking, the issue could be resolved in the following directions: ensuring conditions for the country's comprehensive prosperity and preserving the unity of the nation; strengthening the country's own material potential and maintaining its Armed Forces in a permanent state of high combat readiness; fully opening Bulgaria to the neighboring Balkan countries, the Western democracies, and its former Warsaw Pact partners, including the USSR, on the principle of real equality; integrating the country into the European integration structure—the European Community, the West European Union, and NATO; actively participating in the construction of the structures of the new all-European collective security system; and so forth.

The new guarantees of our national security must be multidirectional and real. We must not rely on a single factor. Those guarantees must be determined after carefully assessing the country's possibilities and its traditions, as well as the attitude of other countries toward Bulgaria and the development of the processes in Europe, the world, the Balkans, and within Bulgaria itself.

[Boyadzhieva] Certain people put forward the idea that Bulgaria's place is in NATO. According to ATLANTIC NEWS, NATO's bulletin published in Brussels, "NATO has a careful attitude toward the willingness of the East European countries to establish closer relations." The experts understand that there is a long way to go until the CSCE system begins to function and the interests of every state are guaranteed. In this context, is it realistic to talk in terms of Bulgaria joining NATO?

[Petrov] Recently, this issue became the subject of many commentaries, and not only on the part of individuals. The Grand National Assembly also dealt with this issue. Some 135 Grand National Assembly members already signed a letter requesting to begin steps aimed at joining NATO and the West European Union. I would say that, at least for the time being, this is not a realistic matter.

From NATO's viewpoint, our integration in the pact will not bring any political and military advantages. On the contrary, this would block the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces because those talks are still based on a mandate worked out on the bloc system. Such an act would inevitably lead to certain changes in the bloc's political and military structure, something NATO hardly desires at present. The USSR would consider this a serious provocation. Furthermore, such a step would isolate the USSR and strengthen its mistrust of the West, something that would delay the development of the all-European process.

As far as Bulgaria is concerned, I will point out only one consideration. For us to join NATO would mean to adapt our Armed Forces to the organization's norms. They would have to participate in the policy of standardization of weapons and combat equipment. Just from the financial point of view, this is absolutely impossible at the present stage.

I would like to again point out the following: Without striving to join NATO, Bulgaria must develop and strengthen its relations with this organization in all directions.

Officers Legion Holds Talks With SDS Leaders

AU2004172091 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
16 Apr 91 p 2

[Text] On 16 April, at the invitation of Filip Dimitrov, representatives of the G.S. Rakovski Officers Legion had a meeting with the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS].

The guests briefed the SDS leaders on the legion's membership, aims, and tasks. The legion has about 12,000 members, representing approximately half of the officers corps. Members range from cadets to generals, but most are medium-ranking officers. According to the union's leadership, approximate parity has been established in the Bulgarian Army concerning political leanings.

Despite this, there are frequent instances of former dignitaries of the military *nomenklatura* making appeals for a revanche.

Both sides shared the view that this first meeting provided a good guarantee for future contacts between the legion and the SDS.

POLAND

Krakow Military District To Be Reorganized

PM2204091091 *Krakow* GAZETA KRAKOWSKA
in Polish 11 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Miroslaw Kozmin: "Krakow Army To Be With Us Again"]

[Text] "Krakow has always been an important military center," we were told by Colonel Boguslaw Koczur, chief of the Voivodship Military Headquarters and acting commander of the Krakow Garrison. "It was here that the ideas of our insurgents and independence fighters were born and freedom movements initiated. Until 1954 Krakow was the center of a regional military district, with its headquarters based at the 'Royal' [passage illegible]. However, after the considerable cuts in our army's numerical strength, a major reorganization took place. As a result, the number of military districts was reduced to three: the Silesian Military District, the Pomeranian Military District, and the Warsaw Military District. Krakow was made subordinate to the last of these."

Today, however, the political and military contours of Europe are changing. The Warsaw Treaty effectively no longer exists. Yesterday's enemies—as we were persuaded to brand them—from NATO are opening up borders of friendship to Poland today. It is small wonder that our military doctrine is changing accordingly and, consequently, so are plans for the disposition of troops

throughout the country. The Krakow Military District will be set up in line with these.

The District's area will be carved out of the Warsaw District, which presently extends over 23 voivodships in central and southern Poland. The territorial limits of the Krakow District have not yet been decided. Initial projections stipulate that it should include, among others, Czeszochowa and Piotrkow Voivodships, as well as a part of Katowice Voivodship.

The district will be made up of defensive units, among others. Its main strength will be provided by mechanized divisions, and also the existing landing assault brigades and mountain infantry brigades. These must be backed up by sound antitank and air defense, as well as reconnaissance capacity. The region's headquarters and staff will be based in Krakow. To date no decision has been made regarding the appointment of the officer commanding the Krakow Military District. Some officers expect that this important post will be entrusted to the present commander of the Krakow Military District's Organization and Preparation group, Major Gen. Bde. Zenon Bryk. So far this remains pure speculation.

How long will it take to establish the new military district? It is not possible to give a precise answer to this question at the moment. Changes of this kind involve high expenditure. This is why a lot depends on the state budget's financial capability. In the first place, it is necessary to prepare barrack accommodations for troops and housing for career officer cadres, as well as the indispensable social facilities infrastructure. It is only after this has been done that we can begin the operation of moving divisions. It is also proposed to create new military units. The Krakow Military District professional personnel will total several thousand officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. Some of them will be recruited from the Silesian and Pomeranian Military Districts, which are reducing their numerical potential. Only the best can expect to be accepted. The possibility is not excluded that recruitment will take the form of a kind of special competition.

BULGARIA

15 Company Heads Under Criminal Investigation

*AU2304195691 Sofia BTA in English 1854 GMT
23 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 23 (BTA)—Preliminary proceedings have been initiated against 15 managers of large Bulgarian companies, Gen. Leonid Katsamunski, chief of the Criminal Investigation Department, announced at a briefing today. The action was taken by the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office.

Gen. Katsamunski pointed out that between August and December 1990, acting in their official capacity, they have infringed upon their official duties and have exceeded their authority. They set up a joint-stock company named Industrialimport Inc. in which the articles of association identified them as both manufacturers and consumers. This happened at a time when the Grand National Assembly had banned the transformation of state and municipal companies and there was a moratorium on the sale of state-owned real estate property. As members of the Board of Directors of Industrialimport, they controlled property valued at a total of over 101 million leva which they used for their own benefit and for the benefit of their families. They also distributed shares.

More Companies To Be Investigated for Abuses

*AU2404193091 Sofia BTA in English 1736 GMT
24 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 24 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Agroimpex Company, which is based in the town of Vratsa and has a branch in Italy, is under investigation on charges of economic malpractices and financial abuses, the Vratsa Police Department reported.

Inquiries will be launched as well into the activities of other newly-founded private companies whose owners, former directors of state enterprises engaged in a similar line of business, are suspected of doing damage to the state in the interest of their own companies.

Fifteen big state companies' director generals suspected of malfeasance and failures in duty are under preliminary investigation.

Sliven Companies Owe 17 Million Leva in Taxes

*AU2004172791 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
16 Apr 91 p 2*

[Report by Georgi VI. Popov]

[Text] Sliven—The statement made by Minister Ivan Kostov on television last Saturday [20 April] that many enterprises throughout the country are not paying their taxes and thereby sabotaging the reform is confirmed. In

Sliven, the industrial enterprises, including the giant Georgi Dimitrov textile concern, owe over 17 million leva in taxes.

Conference on Oil Prospecting on Black Sea Shelf

*AU2004190891 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
16 Apr 91 p 2*

[Report by Lev Kokushkin]

[Excerpt] At the present time, about 35 percent of world oil production comes from offshore fields. Over 60 coastal states obtain both petroleum and gas from thousands of fields located in their coastal waters. As for Bulgaria, on 31 May 1951, the first probe well started up near Shabla. From this well, we have received minimal amounts of petroleum and have also been causing major contamination of the surrounding Black Sea waters.

This information was reported at a colloquium on the subject "Prospecting and Operating Oil and Gas Fields: Ecological Aspects," which was organized in Sofia on 15 April by the Geopont Company of Varna. Apart from representatives from various Bulgarian institutes, committees, and enterprises, the participants included experts from such famous companies as British Gas, Enterprise Oil (UK), and Texaco (United States).

All those present agreed that petroleum and gas reserves do exist underground in Bulgaria, especially in the Black Sea shelf, and that the only possible reason preventing us from obtaining this oil and gas is the lack of equipment and technologies. The aforementioned companies, as well as two others from Belgium and Austria, are ready to sign a contract with our government under which they will make test drillings and, if oil or gas fields are discovered, it is planned to form joint companies to exploit them. Mr. Hughes, regional director of British Gas, Mr. Nunn, Texaco's regional manager for Europe, and Mr. Blunsher, director for safety and environmental protection of Enterprise Oil, despite the fact that they are strong competitors in the world market, this time all agreed that their companies are in a position to complete prospecting operations within six months, after which they will build a commercial production platform within three years. [passage omitted]

HUNGARY

Legal Provisions Affecting Enterprise Managers

*91CH0492A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
21 Mar 91 p 6*

[Index to laws affecting high-level enterprise managers by the National Association of Employers and Managers]

[Text] Index to laws affecting the responsibility of high-level enterprise managers (presidents, directors) as of 20 January 1991:

- Transformation plan: Law No. 13 of 1989, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 38.
- Share to be paid after state property: Law No. 43 of 1989, MAGYAR KOZLONY [issue not designated].
- Constitutional Court: Law No. 32 of 1989, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 77.
- Retraining: State Wage and Labor Affairs Office decree No. 1 of 11 January 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 3.
- Temporary unemployment compensation: Council of Ministers decree No. 7 of 29 January 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 7.
- State Property Agency: Law No. 7 of 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 13, and Law No. 53 of 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 71.
- Protection of state assets: Law No. 8 of 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 13.
- Foundations based on the Civil Code of Laws: Law No. 1 of 1990 and Council of Ministers decree No. 75 of 25 April 1990.
- Foundations, operating rules: MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 56 of 1990, Industry Ministry decree No. 12 of 13 June 1990.
- Constitution, 1990, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 84.
- Amendment to the law governing state enterprises: MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 92, 18 September 1990.
- Provisions concerning the state enterprise supervisory committee: MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 70 of 13 August 1990.
- Contribution to be paid after state property: Law No. 43 of 1989 as amended, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 67, 13 July 1990.
- Tax regulatory processes: Law No. 91 of 1990 MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 27; Finance Ministry decree No. 25 of 25 December 1990 concerning changes in Council of Ministers decree No. 129 of 20 December 1989 and Finance Ministry decree No. 44 of 20 December 1989.
- Sales taxes: Law No. 94 of 1990 amending Law No. 40 of 1989.
- Court procedures for tax collection: Industry Ministry decree No. 6 of 28 June 1988.

Prepared by: National Association of Employers and Managers

POLAND

Bielecki on Paris Club Relief, Economic Policy

91EP0385A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 12, 23 Mar 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki by Jerzy Baczynski and Adam Krzeminski; place and date not given: "The Polish Case"]

[Text] [POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, we are meeting the day after the Western states decided to reduce the Polish debt by 50 percent. We are the first and thus far the only country, one-half of whose debt the creditors have resolved to write off. We congratulate you and the entire negotiating team. On the other hand, we sought greater [reductions]. What is your response to the decision of the Club of Paris?

[Bielecki] I will admit that we were somewhat surprised by how soon this decision was made. We expected it to come as late as the middle of April. The reduction of our debt is a purely political decision. Of course, previously we had to prepare a package of documents for the International Monetary Fund, substantiating the economic necessity of such a reduction. However, we were aware from the very beginning that ultimately the decision belonged to politicians. After all, at least 50 countries are failing to cope with the servicing of their debt. Fortunately, thanks to such inventions as commertel I could contact by telephone the leaders of the country-creditors of Poland and persuade them that the Polish case was exceptional. President L. Walesa got involved in this offensive of ours by sending personal letters to the heads of the states belonging to the Paris Club. The forthcoming visit by Lech Walesa to the United States was an important circumstance in this regard. I believe that President Bush wanted an agreement in principle on the reduction of our debt to be concluded prior to this visit. At any rate, he interceded on our behalf very much.

[POLITYKA] Others resisted, however.

[Bielecki] One country in particular. I called the prime minister of this important country and asked whether they really had to block an agreement to which other important countries had already consented. When on Thursday night Minister Sawicki called me from Paris saying that the members of the club were reaching a consensus, but at a level lower than 50 percent, we made an instant decision, and stated minimal conditions given which a debt reduction still made sense for us. The representatives of the states communicated with their chiefs, and at about 0400 the communique of which you are aware was written.

[POLITYKA] Fifty percent, instead of the 80 percent we proposed.

[Bielecki] Not quite. There will be specific provisions in addition to the 50 percent, this time on a bilateral basis.

We hope that some countries will agree to greater reductions. In addition, there is an opportunity to convert an extra 10 percent of the debt into zlotys, and to earmark these amounts for environmental protection in Poland. Arduous negotiations with partners during which we will coordinate the way to enact this agreement are yet to begin.

[POLITYKA] What are the consequences of the debt reduction going to be for our economy?

[Bielecki] President of Mexico Salinas de Gortari, who is implementing a virtually exemplary stringent economic policy, has secured a 16-percent debt reduction from the governments of creditor countries. This became a signal that Mexico is once again a country in which it is possible and worthwhile to invest. Within a year, \$13 billion migrated there. In addition to regaining credibility and financial liquidity, we may now also count on a more significant influx of investment capital. This is why we are in such a hurry to draft a new law on companies with the participation of foreign capital (the law has already gone through the first reading in the Sejm) in order to take advantage of the psychological effect of the debt reduction.

[POLITYKA] However, Mr. Prime Minister, the continuation of an economic policy which is referred to in brief as the Balcerowicz plan and of what we have committed ourselves to with the IMF for at least three years are the conditions for the reduction of the Polish debt. There is a carrot, and there a stick. If we undertake to pursue a policy coordinated with the IMF then, pardon us, in whose name? You will be prime minister, say, another half year. What about later? Who is to guarantee that your successors will not do some about-face?

[Bielecki] Obviously, this is a key question. Apart from the president and the Senate, nobody has a mandate which was gained through free elections. However, we could not wait until a new parliament is elected. A moratorium on servicing our debt was to expire at the end of March, and a prompt decision by the creditors was as important to us as the scale of the reduction itself.

[POLITYKA] What is going to happen if the terms of our agreement with the IMF and the creditors become the target of attacks and charges of "national treason" and "selling off our sovereignty" in the course of an election campaign?

[Bielecki] Nothing is forcing us to use the aid of the IMF or the extraordinary debt reduction. We have a free choice. For example, if we said today that we are not going pay on our obligations anyway, nobody would sequester our assets or dispatch gunboats. These times are long gone. It is just that a couple years from now we would return to the point of departure and would have to agree on a new stabilization program, but on worse terms this time. This variant was tested in, among other places, Peru.

There is always a threat that demagoguery will prevail. Let us look at Argentina which is embarking on a stabilization policy, if I am not mistaken, for the 11th time. Those who opposed sacrifices and offered easier solutions have always come along...and later they had to return to the point of departure. World experience indicates that chances to succeed in combating inflation are the best on the first try. We have not lost this chance yet.

[POLITYKA] You are talking about universal rules. In this case, what does sovereignty amount to in the economy? What is the leeway for the conduct of a national economic policy by the state?

[Bielecki] I believe that sovereignty results primarily from private property and the degree of affluence. If we become a country of rich citizens why would a Pole not invest in Japan or Western Europe? In this case, the question of sovereignty disappears. Those who are afraid of the present-day global economy talk about sovereignty. This economy is increasingly supranational.

[POLITYKA] In other words, if we remain poor, we condemn ourselves to the feeling of restricted sovereignty?

[Bielecki] This is why we should grow rich. No matter how we look at geopolitics, the stronger we are as a partner the more they are going to reckon with us.

[POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, the French deputies found that only eight percent of strategic economic decisions are made in the parliament, and the rest are made somewhere in the bureaucracies of the EEC, in Brussels, or elsewhere. Do we also become a party to this logic by signing the pact with the IMF and the debt reduction agreement?

[Bielecki] Let us dwell on this reasoning because it is interesting. Who makes economic policy—the government or the businessmen? When the American government wants to spend several hundred million dollars it must seek the consent of the Congress which procrastinates and resists. In turn, when American private capital wants to invest, say, \$12 billion in Great Britain it does not have to ask either a minister or the parliament. Therefore, on the one hand there is the state which participates less and less in economic life; on the other hand, there are corporations and individual entrepreneurs who do what the market and their potential dictate. Instead of the sovereignty of decisionmaking, we should refer to its concentration or dispersion. How many people are there, such as Poehl, chairman of the German Federal Bank, who influence world currency markets? Fifty? Eighty?

[POLITYKA] Here is a question. At what time will the parliament say: Stop, we are the ones expressing the will of the people, we determine the direction.

[Bielecki] For God's sake, [they] do not [determine] currency exchange rates or whether a given factory

should be closed, because this is up to the market. However, it is true that the politicians and the deputies should think in economic terms. Only in our country it has become generally accepted that politics has nothing in common with economics because politics means filling positions with your own people, throwing out old voivodes, and so on. After us, the deluge, as long as ours gain power.

[POLITYKA] In this case, economic necessities, including the international obligations we have contracted in conjunction with the debt reduction, would call for a certain degree of autonomy of the policy and the economic team which the name of Balcerowicz conjures up, regardless of who is prime minister. Can you say at present that you are Balcerowicz's boss?

[Bielecki] As the head of government, I am responsible for the policy which we implement. A prime minister cannot be a puppet; a steady game hinges on him. Likewise, there is no need to excessively personalize our policy, though it is obviously good for the Western world to know who is behind a given policy. This is why it was important for me to show up in Davos in order for influential people to be able to meet me and question me.

[POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, in the case of the Polish government the arrangement is exceptionally favorable because you and Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz speak the same language and think similarly about politics and economics. However, should we not defend the economy in Poland against party politics? Should a pact not be concluded under the auspices of the president in order to defend reforms against an onslaught by populists and demagogues?

[Bielecki] In principle, something of this nature should come about. Our reform calls for explaining precisely to our society what the realities and the dangers are. For example, when Martyniuk told me during our first warm-up exchange at negotiations with the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] that he could not come to terms with me because I subscribe to different economics, I could only tell him in response that there is one, empirical economics, and the other one is a Marxist utopia. It is just that there are certain elementary economic principles which should be upheld, and in this sense the economy is indeed autonomous. However, we can argue ways to implement these principles. Switching from one system to another is a great experiment, and nobody can have a monopoly on the truth. Of course, we will make numerous mistakes, and we have already made some, for example, when a greater amount of credit funds was issued in the second half of 1990. A railroad strike was on, and there were also hopes that a recovery would come about. Meanwhile, it turned out that wages increased, but all of the increase contributed to inflation rather than promoting [growth] trends. At present, they yell "Balcerowicz must go." However, this has to do with economic ABC's rather than with Balcerowicz. Fully exempting newly formed entities from

taxes was also a mistake. Taxes should have been deeply cut, but not pruned off, because this is demoralizing. We should instill discipline and educate.

[POLITYKA] As Western bankers do to us?

[Bielecki] More or less.

[POLITYKA] However, will a social pact for reforms under the auspices of the president come about?

[Bielecki] The president could make such a proposal because he is supposed to be an arbiter above the special interests of groups. So far, my cooperation with Lech Walesa has proceeded very well, and I believe that the president supports and understands the policy of our government.

[POLITYKA] Are you not afraid of this telephone call: Jan, consider yourself recalled?

[Bielecki] This is complicated in my case, because the parliament recalls me, but it is known that I come "from the briefcase" of the president. I believe that in the event of such a telephone call I would not engage in much of a discussion. I believe that I can decide one way or the other and disagree with the president, for example, on the issue of reprivatization. However, there has got to be an understanding between us, at the very least because the president got his mandate in free elections and has a strong constitutional position.

[POLITYKA] Given this breakneck structure: You are invested by the president, the president is elected, the Sejm is contractual, and so on—what is the social base [of support] of your government?

[Bielecki] An accord of sensible people which POLITYKA has written so much about is such a base, a real base, but for the short term. These are people who care about Poland being successful.

[POLITYKA] Do you feel this support or rather the breath of the streets where the OPZZ and the Center Accord are already present?

[Bielecki] Public opinion surveys indicate that I do have support after all. To be sure, no significant coalition of groups or parties stands behind me, but in general, sentiments are not adverse to this government. Many statements indicate that a good number of Poles want Poland to reach European standards before the end of this decade. If so, we should say that this will call for a great effort on our part, that there will be no miracle, but there is hope. An accord of sensible people on behalf of the market economy would facilitate this process greatly, at least initially. Later we will have the ideal middle class which will carry forth this policy.

[POLITYKA] The drift of our question was would you like to run in elections half a year from now as a prime minister who stands for a government bloc? You have a little bit of time, and you can make a play for your own political position.

[Bielecki] There are two issues involved here. First, initially I believed that I was embarking on a certain very insecure service. It was late December, the second day of [Christmas] holidays, and Walesa made me this offer. I had to accept the risk without asking. Second, I believed that this was an opportunity to reinforce Polish liberalism, of course, with a large admixture of etatism, for which the classical, conservative liberal Korwin-Mikke still assails me. I appreciate this criticism because it makes me understand how far I am removed from liberalism of the purest hue. I make no secret of my wish to lead a broad-based liberal coalition in the elections. In many countries, liberals amount to a significant party, if not too numerous, which unites interesting personalities and participates in public life to a greater degree than elections would suggest.

[POLITYKA] As does the FDP [Free Democratic Party] of Genscher and Lambsdorff in Germany. Given this, how did you take the decision of the Sejm which gave you half a year? This is no longer five minutes for the liberals, but an entire 15 minutes.

[Bielecki] The fact that democracy still has not prevailed, and that we do not have parliamentary support is not a healthy one. Perhaps, some terribly short campaign would not have caused a major storm in the country. However, the process of changes which should advance and maintain continuity is the second issue. If we do not prepare a tax reform promptly it will not be introduced on 1 January 1992 because six months are required to implement it. If we do not prepare a new law on education, children will go to old schools on 1 September, including the famous instruction on the issue of religion. Continuity is extremely important, all the more so because we make essential mistakes which should be rectified, for example, in the law on self-government, so that gminas will indeed be able to stand on their own feet financially.

[POLITYKA] Therefore, the year 1991 will be the year of Bielecki because you will certainly remain prime minister at least until November.

[Bielecki] "The year of Bielecki" sounds nice, but I am more modest than that. This is a very essential year, in which many things should happen. We have the initial evidence of that. When I entered this office my position was unenviable. I was a parachutist from Gdansk, a fact which had already provided a pretext for malicious jeers. I was unknown in political life and, in addition, I came in after an election campaign following which a segment of our society believed that life was going to get better.

[POLITYKA] And after the mission of Attorney Olszewski collapsed.

[Bielecki] In addition, this was a moment when the voices of the avenging trend began to be heard again, when they called for slaughtering the nomenklatura and clearing the foreground. Finally, I came at a time when the country was awash in strikes; this was the impression I got based on daily reports which I received here. By

now, we have succeeded in stabilizing this somewhat, and this is a success in itself. After all, when you put out fires you have no time for normal work.

[POLITYKA] Are you not afraid of a wildfire of strikes at present?

[Bielecki] I am not afraid of some strike which will grow into a general strike, despite the fact that the lack of respect for the law on trade unions adopted in 1982 facilitates inducing such actions. However, I see that the OPZZ is actually an opponent of a market economy. I also remember the words of Miodowicz that a blow by strikes may be struck at the neuralgic points of the economy. This trade union organization bandies about the slogan of the market, but when you reduce their concepts to factors of the first order it turns out that there can be no market in Poland. We do not oppose the state sector and do not regard privatization as salutary. However, there must be competition for the state sector; the latter must operate in such an environment. Besides, we in Poland should take a cool glance at what has happened in the GDR, this, seemingly, the 10th largest industrial power of the world. The issue in the Polish economy is not whether to repeal or preserve the tax on excess wages, but rather whether jobs should be preserved or whether we should agree to unemployment. In the GDR, unemployment stands at 27 percent.

[POLITYKA] However, is it not the case that not only the OPZZ but also workers' Solidarity wage a war against the excess wage tax?

[Bielecki] Actually, I just learned a moment ago from TV about Krzaklewski saying that a discussion with the government does not make sense, and that negotiations should be passed on down to enterprises. Except for one well-known expert who is tormented by unhealthy ambitions, Solidarity does not assail us on account of economic policy by demanding that production be increased. There is no reason to increase the production of what is not in demand; these are methods which belong in another era. A large segment of Solidarity activists understand this. A considerable segment of peasant politicians also act this way, though they do not say this. They demand out loud guaranteed minimal prices which the government should subsidize.

[POLITYKA] We may understand the apprehensions of farmers. After all, we should not be under the delusion that gaining access to the EEC market is the future of our agriculture; after all, the EEC countries are already choking on surplus products.

[Bielecki] This poses a great challenge for an active Eastern policy of Poland because that market should be the customer for a large segment of our farm products. Of course, Poland wants to join the EEC structures in the future, but also to develop the best relations possible with our large partner to the east, both with the USSR as a whole and with individual republics. The Soviet republics want to trade with us very much, but they do not have the wherewithal to pay us. That is to say, they can

pay in rubles; they have a lot of them. This, however, is not real money. The ruble is not convertible. Perhaps, we have switched to dollar-denominated settlements too rapidly. I believe that we should return to more primitive forms of trade, say, hard-currency clearing, proposed by us last year, actually a goods-for-goods exchange only the balance of which would be settled for in hard currency.

[POLITYKA] Perhaps, we buried the CEMA in general too soon. We are not referring to the ossified structure, but to a certain idea of regional economic cooperation adapted to local conditions. All countries of the former [socialist] camp wanted to proceed to Europe right away and independently, turning away from their own past and each other. Is this attitude going away?

[Bielecki] Quite recently, indeed a contest and bidding occurred as to which country is the most European, most democratic, and has gone the farthest away from communism. On occasion, this assumed altogether embarrassing forms. I would recall that recently the Visegrad declaration referred to "cooperation in striving for European integration." In other words, without giving up the main goal, integration with Western Europe, we should prove our maturity and prepare for the meeting through "little" integration.

[POLITYKA] What is your view of this maturity of ours?

[Bielecki] Some behaviors learned under communism are turning out to be unusually persistent. I am thinking, for example, about the force of give-me attitudes—we will strike and protest until the government gives us.... There is reluctance and fear of taking responsibility for one's own future.

[POLITYKA] Indeed, but many people, including those in the state sector, do not want charity from the government but rather a clear definition of the rules of the game and prospects. Which industries are going to be liquidated and which will be supported? What will be subjected to privatization and through what procedures? They have a right to know.

[Bielecki] Yes, but the government cannot give just any answer. We are actually about to finish the so-called sector studies which will make it possible to outline the industrial policy of the state. Likewise, in the area of privatization we must revise certain previous assumptions concerning, for example, the scale of privatization through the sale of shares to the public, or the guidelines for asset appraisal. Several people have learned appraisal techniques from Western consultants, and this was made into a fetish. Using thorough appraisals, we must avoid the sale of assets for peanuts. However, what is going to happen if a Polish citizen purchases a segment of poorly used assets, even at low prices, and ensures its higher productivity? Who stands to lose by this? Is it the Budget which will be rid of the ballast? Is it the country? Now that we have a little bit more time, we can ponder better a strategy of government operations and look for more efficient ways to solve problems which emerge.

[POLITYKA] Unemployment, for example.

[Bielecki] In this instance, we should start by determining how many unemployed we really have, and how many of them are unemployed voluntarily. The fact that unemployment appeared mainly due to an entirely passive attitude on the part of enterprises worries me even more than the scale of unemployment. When the enterprises encountered difficulties with sales, they preferred to restrict production and lay people off rather than to cut costs or attempt vigorous marketing. Genuine unemployment will begin together with genuine restructuring. There are signals to the effect that enterprises are only now beginning to "crack." Last year, the standing of all of them was equally poor; at present, differentiation in their situation is setting in. We should develop government programs for counteracting unemployment, and we will do so.

[POLITYKA] An economic recovery would be the best way to control unemployment. Meanwhile, we are up to our eyeballs in a recession, and this "cracking" does not augur well either.

[Bielecki] We say recession, and we do not know precisely what we are talking about, as is the case with unemployment. We measure the decline of production compared to some unreal year 1989, while at the same time extensive spheres of new economic activities are not picked up by our statistics, for example, private foreign trade.... However, I think that we will register an increase in production compared to last year. However, I want to say explicitly that the government will not induce an artificial recovery by pumping into the economy hollow money. We should overcome the recession by means of structural changes and changes in ownership. Various foundations and agencies which have been set up recently pursue this goal.

[POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, as you have said, on the second day of [Christmas] holidays you became a politician virtually from nowhere who has gained considerable popularity in the country within 100 days. Regardless of how the fall elections turn out, you will remain an active politician....

[Bielecki] About this popularity of mine. When I received the results of the latest polls including 26 names, I looked at the bottom, as I usually do, and I was a little bit disappointed because it appeared to me that I should be there, but I was not. At this point, the cabinet director asked me: Well, are you satisfied? Satisfied with what? That I did not make the list? What do you mean by that, you are number four?

However, there is nothing to say about my further political plans. I treat my office as a service, a segment of work which needs to be done.

[POLITYKA] What is the greatest difficulty for you in this position? What is it that you cannot learn?

[Bielecki] To speak. I can make a good showing but, I think, rather in conversations with small groups of people; I am worse with a medium-size group, and the worst at a rally. I have never been, and will never, be a loudmouth at rallies. I will not be an effective speaker either; you either have it or you do not. The Davos speech cost me a lot of nerves, despite the fact that I wrote the text itself in English to begin with, in order to preserve the rhythm of the language. I knew that I was talking to the several dozen people who matter. Actually, this is a small world; in the world of politics, everyone knows everyone else. I understood this on Wall Street at a time when I was introduced to that community.

[POLITYKA] So, you do not want to say anything about your political future, despite the fact that you are only 39!

[Bielecki] Why? I belong to the "combatant pool," and I believe that our role is to blaze the trail for those who will come after us, and quite soon. They will come without the burdens we carry and without complications in their biographies. They will come simply by way of regular political advancement, say, through my liberal party [Liberal-Democratic Congress] whose position I would like to reinforce. New elites will develop built on their own success, elites which will be neither nomenklatura or underground ones.

[POLITYKA] You very much want our country to cover by a single jump the psychological and material distance which separates us from Europe. Do you have a fall-back variant if the jump falls short?

[Bielecki] Have you read "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest?" Do you remember the bet by the main character that he would rip out a sink built into the wall? We should try, even if others tap their foreheads. A certain professor from Oxford who wishes us well said that the Poles are not capable of adapting to Europe due to their own tradition and demoralization caused by communism. Abandoning old customs will be as difficult as Nicholson's rebellion was. However, the condition is the same. We should believe in our own strength and rely on ourselves. This sounds like a peroration, but it is true. Even if Nicholson dies he sets the Indian free.

Many people defend the old order more or less openly because we have not openly told them that they lived in an unreal world, that of an unreal economy. The concepts of softening the current economic policy, or changing it in principle, boil down to mixing dreams and reality in different proportions. It was needlessly said that "it is going to get better in half a year." We have secured the consent for building a market economy from the people who actually are not quite aware of what this market economy is about. Hence there is a wave of complaints about the government at present, to the effect that "this is not the way it was supposed be." I believe that we will have gone past the critical point of the reform when the citizens complain about their lot to themselves rather than the government. For its part, the

government should create conditions for the universally proven principles to apply in our country.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Small-Business Development Discussed

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[Interview with Krzysztof Bialowolski, deputy secretary of state in the Ministry of Trade, by Ewa Szemplinska; place and date not given: "We Know How To Fight, but We Do Not Have the Ammunition"]

[Text] [Szemplinska] Among the small and medium-scale businessmen, as well as those who would like to set up operations, it is often said that the government does not attach enough importance to the development of private business. On the one hand there is talk about indispensable development, and on the other this is a "neglected child" which is supposed to develop and bring itself up. As the person responsible in the state administration for the development of small-scale business, do you share this view and where do you see allies for your work?

[Bialowolski] My allies are many governmental agencies and those representing the business community. They include the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Ownership Transformations, the Agency for Development of Industry, regional chambers of commerce, the National Chamber of Commerce, economic societies, KRTG [expansion unknown], and finally the territorial self-managements. And I believe that it is very important to come to an understanding with these institutions and obtain their cooperation in the development of small business.

[Szemplinska] How do you feel about the formation of an American-type organization such as the Small Business Administration which, independent of various social, community, and local associations, is a quasi-governmental agency unceasingly supporting the development of entrepreneurship and constituting a kind of early-warning system when something in this business is beginning to go in the wrong direction?

[Bialowolski] I believe there is no sense in creating new organizations in view of the many potential advocates I enumerated. This would be a multiplication of administrative entities in a situation when we have enough of them and know exactly what should be done. It is enough to read what the Americans, French, or Koreans are doing to know what instruments are needed and which are most effective, how to train, promote, install new technologies, or where to apply relief. Nothing new has to be thought of here.

[Szemplinska] Then where do you begin?

[Bialowolski] Where it appears that the everything cannot be done at once.

[Szemplinska] That is, proceeding too rapidly has caused you to become mired?

[Bialowski] In any case, the queue of laws which have to be changed to make them consistent with one another, and the number of laws for the next half-year's work of the government, is enormous. And let us say that both the businessmen as well as I can see that the system of bank guarantees is poor, and the institution of mortgages is dead. But to change this, a new banking law is needed. We know that the underground economy, and that uncontrolled and untaxed business, for example, the street vendors or construction groups which work "off the books," has a bad influence on the process of legally establishing a business. In order to eliminate this, economic order and controllers of this order are needed, e.g., in the form of an economic and tax police. We will not be able to do this overnight either. Another example is the openness of our borders and the abundance of illegal or semilegal imports, which will always be cheaper than the product made in Poland (by our own or even a foreign manufacturer). Furthermore, a rational customs tax policy has to be applied so that investments in certain fields are profitable for domestic and foreign businesses. This means that a duty must be put on certain goods.

[Szemplinska] For a liberal, that is quite an original viewpoint. I, for example, prefer the cheaper, and very often the better, imported goods than our own. And I admit to you that I am not very concerned about the fate of the Polish cheesemaker who produces foul cheese, or the wretched farmer from Mława, who presses soured milk on me. And for you, as a liberal, this should be the position you should take, and it is not.

[Bialowski] I am a complete believer in economic liberalism, but I also believe that the state should conduct a rational policy of protecting its own producers. It should have clearly defined priorities which it supports, and from which it begins to rebuild the system.

[Szemplinska] In the field which you represent, what are these priorities?

[Bialowski] Precisely economic order, the elimination of those aspects which do not help the development of small business, a system of bank guarantees—in my opinion, more important than credits—which can be obtained both in our country and from foreign funds (I am talking now with the Ministry of Finance on the subject of guarantees); finally, the most simple advice on the rural-township level pertaining to the establishment of a business and explaining the law on tax obligations, which is inordinately complicated.

[Szemplinska] Let us return for a moment to the question of foreign competition. I support the position that goods imported for the purpose of selling them should be taxed, and perhaps even certified from the standpoint of usefulness, but do you not believe that introducing open competition is an incentive for development?

[Bialowski] Before competition develops, our economy will die.

[Szemplinska] You do not believe in the self-defense instinct?

[Bialowski] Have you seen a bankrupt factory? I really feel that I am a liberal, but I believe that during the stage of transition to an open market, the economy must be manually controlled and state intervention is indispensable. I believe that the lesser evil is a controlled opening up to the world and support of our own businessmen. Otherwise there will be disaster.

[Szemplinska] At the beginning of our conversation you talked about the allies of your office, listing the Ministry of Finance first, about which all businessmen complain.

[Bialowski] Everyone who pays taxes complains, and the businessmen also complain about the lack of investment allowances. The Ministry of Finance proposes a change in depreciation write-offs, which is a type of allowance. However, because the law must be uniform for everyone and the tax system must be consistent, a part of the law cannot be changed because of certain groups. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance understands very well that the underground circulation of money and business must be stopped, except that to bring about order, money and a tax police are needed. And we do not have this ammunition.

[Szemplinska] Self-managements, are they really allies? The businessmen complain mostly about rents, which are killing them.

[Bialowski] That is true. I hear the complaints of the craftsmen, and I know that this cannot be left as it is. I also know that during the transition period the state has to make a decision, either rent controls or subsidies. Unless we want to lose some of the businessmen. But I think that someday, when the self-managements understand that more good comes from low rents and protection of many businessmen than from bleeding the survivors, they will become our allies.

[Szemplinska] Societies and chambers of commerce?

[Bialowski] I come out of the chamber-of-commerce movement and I believe that the state administration should help the chambers and also cede to them the obligation of training, consultation, and all service functions for small business. I am also a believer in the concept that membership in the chambers of commerce should be obligatory.

[Szemplinska] We have just dispensed with obligatory memberships and furthermore, if the chambers are good, they will have no problem in obtaining members.

[Bialowski] But this will go on for years, and this lesson has to be completed very quickly. In addition, if the chambers are obligatory, the state will be able to assist them financially, and no one will interfere in the election of the leaders, the organization, or the social control of

the chambers. Furthermore, chambers enriched by membership dues will be able to do more intensive work in their own area. And the government will also have a strong partner.

[Szemplinska] Perhaps that is correct, but I am always afraid of obligatory solutions, which begin with helping our friends and end with bureaucratic structures. This is not a liberal option.

[Bialowolski] But after thinking about it I come to the conclusion that it is a correct solution. It speeds up the change process, making the life of an ordinary businessman, and particularly those just beginning, easier. I believe that this will help, even in the concern about the businessmen's ethics.

[Szemplinska] That is something else. Belief is a term which is not subject to discussion. However, how do you rate the economic societies? Initially there was an enormous zeal to establish them, now less is being heard about their activities and more about their demands of the government.

[Bialowolski] There are many excellent activists in the societies, and many of them have gone into the central government, and the role of the societies is formulated by the opinions and demands of the community. Undoubtedly they could work better and do more for the community, but again we return to the lack of ammunition, i.e., money. The meagerness of funds often does not permit the establishment of data banks, for example, or legally prepared demands from the communities.

[Szemplinska] Let us talk about money.

[Bialowolski] A billion zlotys will be allocated by the Labor Fund this year for the creation of new jobs and financial assistance to the businesses now springing up. We can expect some small foreign assistance from the [British] Know-How Fund, from the EEC, and the Polish-American Enterprise Fund. But on the whole, the situation with funds to stimulate the sector is poor.

Natural Gas Transport Eyed in SE Voivodships

91EP0384A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA
in Polish No 11, 17 Mar 91 p 10

[Article by Ewa Niedzialek: "Regional Initiatives: There Is Gas, There Are Gas-Propelled Cars"]

[Text] The Association for the Development of South-eastern Poland, which includes Rzeszow, Krosno, Premysl, and Tarnobrzeg Voivodships began its operations in Rzeszow several weeks ago. Actually, the people who set up the society have been working on the idea of regionalism for almost two years now. The first meetings were held in the chemical office of Senator Professor Boleslaw Fleszar at the Polytechnical Institute of Rzeszow. From a certain point on, the Wanda Siemaszkowa Theater in Rzeszow has provided headquarters premises for the association. On 23 February, at a

solemn symposium devoted to the issues of regionalism held at a campus of the Catholic University of Lublin in Stalowa Wola on the initiative of Bishop Edward Frankowski, four voivodes from southeastern Poland acknowledged the association to be "an element in the equation which needs to be worked out for the development of the region." During the meeting, the voivodes also signed an agreement on cooperation and the pooling of their efforts aimed at restructuring the economy of the region.

One of the many initiatives of the association which indicates the matter-of-factness of the operation of this body merits a closer look. Let us use as proof a proposal to convert MPK [Municipal Transit Enterprise] buses, delivery vans, and other cars to an additional natural gas fuel supply. Gas deposits which are estimated to be around 7 billion cubic meters exist in the vicinity of Rzeszow. This gas may be successfully used as an additional source of energy in cars. Gas-powered cars have been used in many countries of the world for years; therefore, why should we not think about them, all the more so because such cars were already driven around Rzeszow at one time, and because we have gas deposits in our own territory?

The association solicited the opinion of specialists on this matter. Director of the Rzeszow PTHW [expansion unknown] Engineer Ryszard Grazka said that after the collapse of the government program for gas-powered cars two years ago, the PTHW took on the initiative itself. At present, 18 ZUK's, three STAR's, and one Polonez are parked at the PTHW in Rzeszow; the cars have a dual gasoline-natural gas fuel supply. Filling them up used to be the greatest difficulty; however, for the past half month or so days this has no longer been a problem. In Przybyszowka near Rzeszow, the Sanok Oil and Gas Extraction Enterprise commissioned a station for dispensing natural gas. It may serve 20 vehicles daily; this suffices for the needs of the PTHW to date. However, they want to earn their own keep at the enterprise. A station for servicing natural gas powered cars, the only one in this region and one out of [only] three existing in Poland, is located in the compound of the enterprise. Its employees may convert gasoline-powered cars into natural gas powered vehicles within a short period of time. The cost of this operation comes to 10 percent of the value of a new car.

What about other terms in the calculation? At present, one cubic meter of natural gas costs 1,150 zlotys, and one liter of gasoline costs 4,000 zlotys. Amortization of cars using the two types of fuel is approximately the same. Therefore, the advantage is obvious. However, there is one more aspect which favors the use of natural gas powered cars and is much more essential: natural gas does not pollute the environment when it burns. I attended a demonstration of the two types of fuel at the service station. When a truck using gasoline ran, clouds of exhaust made it impossible to breathe, and detectors indicated a very high percentage of exhaust fumes. After

the same vehicle switched to a gaseous fuel supply, the hands of exhaust detectors virtually hit zero.

Ecologists are raising the alarm. Dr. Engineer Przemyslaw Sanecki, an associate of Professor Fleszar at the Chair of Chemistry in the Polytechnical Institute of Rzeszow, showed me the results of research done in Poland. About 2,100 tons of lead are generated annually due to the use of motor vehicles alone! This works out to eight kilograms per one kilometer of road, and to 50 grams per each statistical Pole, i.e., twice the lethal dose. The fact that this lead is dispersed is the only reason we are alive! When lead infiltrates an organism, it remains there until the end and accumulates! The consequences include albuminuria, kidney and liver diseases, fetal injuries, and mental disorders (increasing aggressiveness, psychoses, and so on). The lead which already circulates in plant and animal organisms, due to a lack of imagination and responsibility on the part of the people, will remain there. However, we need to prevent its further accumulation. In the West, unleaded gasoline has been used for a long time, but we will not be able to afford this any time soon. We will be able to substitute energy carriers sooner. There is no need to purchase them in the southeastern region of the country....

In the secretariat of the mayor of the city of Rzeszow, we learned that general negotiations have already been held on the topic of using the resources of natural gas from Rzeszow for urban transit, but no specific decisions have been made yet.

The PTHW director believes that the most essential point is to build a new gas-dispensing station. Plans and designs have already been prepared, and a standing proposal is also ready. The endeavor is held up by money. The construction of the station will cost about 1 billion zlotys. If the station is built, specialists from the PTHW will convert the urban transit buses within a dozen or so months. They assured us that all costs will be recouped within a dozen months or so.

The association, of which Senator Fleszar is chairman, got the issue of natural gas powered cars off the ground. How do they intend to affect the course of the endeavor in the future? Engineer S. Szczepanski, secretary of the association, said that specialists will make a decision on practical methods of operation. The association will monitor the progress of work. However, as a body engaged in the creation of public opinion, it will strive to create a situation in which all future councilmen will be required to address in their election programs the issues of ecological solutions to the problems of the city.

BULGARIA

Past, Present State of Civil Defense Examined

AU2204182191 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
17 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Georgi Georgiev, colonel in the reserves: "Civil Defense—One of the Totalitarian Regime's 'Step-children'"]

[Excerpts] The crisis in the Persian Gulf prompted lively commentaries and discussions about the defense readiness of our country as a whole, and of Civil Defense, in particular. What is the real state of our civil defense today?

In the first place, we should admit that the protection of the population and the workers is not guaranteed, which endangers the survival of the whole nation in case of war. Important problems related to the protection of our industrial, power supply, and transport installations are still unresolved. Agriculture, the food industry, and trade are not sufficiently equipped to guarantee the population's subsistence under conditions of contemporary war. No effective solutions are provided for the defense of the country's material assets and cultural values.

Why was the fact concealed that shelters for only 3.5 percent of the country's population have so far been built in the exposed areas and in cities classified within the civil defense system? (According to the aforementioned classification, shelters exist for only 6 percent of the population of Sofia. Only 2-3 percent of the population of Plovdiv and 5-6 percent of the population of Burgas are protected by shelters). The population of nearly all other towns and villages is expected to seek protection in its own basements adapted as shelters.

It was also never mentioned that less than 30 percent of the workers' staff in industrial enterprises can be protected in shelters in case of air raids, while only 6 percent of shift workers could find places in antiradiation shelters. In Sofia, for example, 25 enterprises engaged in particularly important areas of production have no protection facilities whatsoever for shift work during wartime. The situation is similar in other large cities, where several hundred thousand workers remain unprotected while they are in their workplaces. Our concern is further aggravated by the fact that most of the few shelters throughout the country were built in the period of World War II or in the 1960's and no longer conform with the requirements of protection against the new, infinitely more powerful and more accurate weapons. They are also unfit to provide the necessary working facilities in wartime. [passage omitted]

The existing water supply system for populated areas is dangerously exposed to weapons of mass destruction, while the so far planned and implemented measures for increasing its reliability are hardly adequate. No necessary financial resources have been provided for the purpose, while the water supply and drainage services

are not effectively equipped to purify the water in case of radioactive or major industrial pollution.

The aforementioned facts unmistakably show that competent and extensively educated people are needed to lead the Civil Defense. For this reason, my colleagues and I were always shocked by General Dzhurov's irresponsible approach in appointing people of his own age group, usually of retirement age (former Navy, or infantry commanders) as chiefs of the Civil Defense. As far as our present commander, General Yovchev, a former division commander, is concerned, he will need two years to get acquainted with the real state of affairs, while, as far as we are concerned, we can only pray for God's mercy.

DUMA Warns Against Increasing Crime Rate

AU2504101891 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 22 Apr 91
p 4

[Commentary by Plamen Enchev: "There Is No Dispute About the Ministry of Internal Affairs Forces, Considering That It Is Uncertain Whether They Still Exist"]

[Text] Bulgaria today looks like Chicago in the 1930's. Organized crime has already become a permanent institution in our country. This is a characteristic feature of all developed democratic countries, as a matter of fact. Without organized crime, we could hardly claim to be a part of Europe.

The time of petty crimes is over. Apartment break-ins and stolen private vehicles are hardly noticed anymore.

Criminals are armed, and they are shooting. Members of the militia forces are being killed.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is being reorganized. The political forces are pulling the strings and are trying to assert their influence over this important ministry.

The militiamen recently buried one of its members who perished as a victim of crime with memorial rallies and processions accompanied by the sound of police car sirens expressing their protest. Meanwhile, unknown persons are breaking into the weekend houses or apartments of National Assembly deputies.

The new draft law on the police was withdrawn from parliament. A new one is in the process of being drafted. It is a new bill on the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The trade unions in the ministry addressed an ultimatum to the government, the president, and parliament, announcing protest demonstrations scheduled as of the beginning of May 1991.

The government intends to establish a special central service for combating organized crime, drugs, and arms trafficking, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the level of an administrative department, in accordance with the Law on the People's Militia, which is still in force.

According to the present Law on the People's Militia, a Militia Directorate with a few departments has already been installed. The new service exists only on paper, while the existence of the militia departments in charge of financial and other crimes is jeopardized by the depletion of the most capable professionals, who are expected to be transferred to the new department.

The political forces call in their statements for a strong police force, but they are dismembering it in practice. The political forces demand a strong police force, but they have deprived the police department of the financial resources to guarantee the policemen's wages. Economic reform is far from making progress at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The minister of internal affairs begs

the minister of finance for money. The militiaman's life is threatened by both the criminal and the iron grip of economic reform. The militiamen have no resources to support their families. Therefore, the militiaman leaves the police force and goes to work in a private enterprise. His family's living standard improves, but there is no one to replace him, and the underworld takes advantage of the situation.

The dispute about the Ministry of Internal Forces almost overthrew parliament and jeopardized the peaceful transition to democracy four months ago. There is no dispute about the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces today, but do they actually still exist?

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